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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays which study different aspects of category captainship, a new
and increasingly popular category management strategy. In this strategy retailers delegate their control
of product categories to one of the manufacturers operating within that category, who is referred to as
the “category captain”. As this practice is new, many answers regarding the optimal implementation of
category captainship remain unanswered. In the first essay we study a model of category captainship
where manufacturers are asymmetric with respect to how many brand-loyal consumers they each posses and
retailers are only able to delegate the single responsibility of the setting of retail prices. Our findings shed
some light on the role of manufacturer size in the category captain selection process. In the second essay we
study a model of category captainship where retailers are able to delegate more than just control of retail
pricing to symmetric manufacturers. Specifically, we allow retailers to also delegate control of two types of
in-store marketing activities: brand marketing activities and category marketing activities. We find that
retailers’ profits from the use of a category captain increase with the number of responsibilities delegated.
In the final essay we study a model of category captainship where the product category contains both high
and low quality products, where low quality products can be either product line extensions or store brands.
We find that the type of low quality product plays an important role in how category captainship affects
both category profit and consumer surplus, two attributes which are generally thought to be enhanced by
the use of a category captain.
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Category captainship is an emerging category management strategy wherein a retailer delegates control of the
day-to-day operations of a product category to one of the manufacturers whose products are carried within
that category. While category captainship was almost non-existent twenty years ago, it is commonplace
today to find it in use at retailers of all sizes: large retailers such as Wal-Mart, Target and Kmart (Raskin,
2003) as well as smaller regional retailers such as Colorado based natural food chain Wild Oats Markets
(Smyth, 1999) and Michigan based grocer Spartan Stores (Garry, 2005). There is also no size requirement
when it comes to which manufacturers can implement category captainship, as both large manufacturers who
compete across a variety of product categories (SC Johnson, Nestle Purina (Raskin, 2003), Kraft (Copple,
2002)), large manufacturers who dominate a narrower range of categories (Coca-Cola, Gillette (Raskin,
2003), Schick (Tenser, 1995)), and even small regional manufacturers (Pope & Talbot (Karolefski, 1995))
have been reported as participating in category captainship to some degree.
One of the primary drivers behind the rapid rise in the adoption of category captainship is that it helps
to increase channel coordination through the partial elimination of double marginalization (Alaimo, 2007;
Raskin, 2003). The manufacturer assuming control of category operations, commonly referred to as the
category captain (CC), is able to price its own products vertically, allowing its products to serve consumers
who were previously out of its reach. In addition to the setting of retail prices, CCs have been known to
assume control over a variety of other category decisions, including, but not limited to, the implementation
of in-store marketing activities (Bushey and Palekar, 2014a; Subramanian et al., 2010), decisions regarding
which product assortment to carry (Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011; Kurtulus et al., 2013), and shelf-space
allocation (Subramanian et al., 2010).
While category captainship is not lacking in popularity among practitioners, there are a number of
critics of the practice who feel that the intimate nature of the relationship between the retailer and the CC
can quickly lead to anti-competitive behavior (Gooner et al., 2011) such as the CC using its position to
exclude some of its rivals from the market altogether (Morgan et al., 2007; Desrochers et al., 2003). And
where there is smoke, there may actually be a fire. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld a
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jury decision in the case of Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., which ordered U.S. Tobacco to
pay Conwood $1.05 billion for allegedly using their role as CC to exclude Conwood’s products from stores
(Wright, 2009). Currently there are cases containing allegations of CC abuse making there way through
the court system involving the product categories of carbonated sodas, cranberries, smokeless tobacco and
tortillas (Desrochers et al., 2003).
With these issues in mind, the main objective of this dissertation is to examine just how negative the
consequences of category captainship can be by simultaneously modeling two of the most controversial aspects
of category captainship: the delegation of retail pricing control (Nijs et al., 2014; Phipps, 2001; Wang et al.,
2003; Kurtulus and Toktay, 2011; Misra et al., 2009) and the awarding of category captainship through an
auction (Bushey and Palekar, 2014a; Subramanian et al., 2010; Kurtulus et al., 2013). Delegating control of
retail price setting to a CC is controversial for two main reasons. The first is that it some feel that it simply
gives too much control and influence to a single manufacturer, as the setting of retail prices is thought to
be the most important decision made within a channel (Choi, 1991; Lee and Staelin, 1997). While it is true
that retailers have always had this power over categories, very few retailers also own one of the handful of
national brands competing within the category they manage. Some worry that the temptation to punish
its rivals by strategically adjusting their retail prices will be too great for the CC to ignore (Morgan et al.,
2007; Desrochers et al., 2003; Gooner et al., 2011).
On the other side of the power-imbalance coin is the awarding of category captainship through an auction
to the highest bidding manufacturer, a practice thought to give too much leverage to the retailer. With
respect to academic studies of category captainship, auctions are one of the two most common methods
used for CC selection, with the other being profit sharing arrangements between the retailer and the CC.
The consensus is that profit sharing arrangements are the less severe of the two options as CC selection
criteria can be based on manufacturer attributes other than just how much money they can make the
retailer, such as basing the selection on that manufacturers’ information regarding consumers’ preferences
(Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011) or the relative size of the manufacturers (Misra et al., 2009). While an auction
for category captainship does not have to be driven purely by short-term profit considerations (the retailer
could be interested in growing its name recognition in the short-term and therefore may award CC to the
manufacturer who can maximize total sales) it does appear that this objective is quite common in industry.
A 1996 survey by the Silvermine Consulting Group reported that 21% of manufacturers had paid for the
right to be chosen as a CC (Tenser, 1996). At the time of the survey, manufacturers reported that requests
from retailers for payments to secure category captainship had been rapidly increasing. The values of the
payments ranged anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000. In fact, there are instances where manufacturers
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approached and offered to pay them for CC designation (Merrefield, 1996).
This dissertation is broken into three essays which each study category captainship under different con-
ditions where category captainship is awarded through an auction and control of retail pricing is always
delegated. In the first essay (Chapter 2) we study how the process of category captainship functions when
retailers both delegate the control of setting retail prices to a category captain (CC) and select this CC
through the use of an auction. Using a game theoretical model of manufacturer competition consisting of
two asymmetric manufacturers and a single retailer, we study the effects that the use of these two attributes
coupled with category captainship has on the profits of the manufacturers, the retailer, the category and
consumers. We find that the primary driver behind the manufacturers’ ability to negate the negative conse-
quences resulting from the delegation of retail pricing control and the selection of the CC through an auction
is the amount of asymmetry present in the group of manufacturers competing for category captainship. As
the amount of asymmetry between the manufacturers increases, the negative impact of category captainship
decreases. To our surprise, we were actually able to identify a very specific set of conditions, which when
present, can lead to both manufacturers profiting from category captainship while the retailer simultaneously
loses money. While these conditions are not prevalent throughout the retailing industry, their mere existence
may be refreshing to opponents of category captainship.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) we study the delegation of both retail price setting and the use of in-store
marketing activities (IMA) to a CC. We investigate, using a game theoretical model, the effects that the
delegation of price and IMA has on the profits of the players involved, the profitability of the category as
a whole and the welfare of the consumers. We introduce a first-price auction without reservation as the
mechanism for selecting a CC and consider two distinct types of IMA, brand-marketing (BM) and category-
marketing (CM) activities. It is commonly believed that the use of category captains will harm the retailer
and the consumers if the CC is given additional category management responsibilities. However, we find the
opposite to be true — retailer gains (and manufacturer losses) are increased as the number of responsibilities
delegated increases. The auction mechanism traps the manufacturers in a prisoner’s dilemma and transfers
all category gains to the retailer. While the use of a CC has the potential to decrease category profit, the
delegation of BM can help to minimize these losses. In addition, we find that BM activities are only used
when a CC is employed and, that the CC increases the use of CM activities. Surprisingly we also find that
consumers may benefit under certain conditions when a CC is present because of the elimination of double
marginalization.
In the final essay (Chapter 4), using a game theoretical model, we first study a category where store
brands are not an option for the retailer to carry on its own due to the lack of an external manufacturer
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capable or producing the desired types of store brands. Instead of store brands we examine a category
where manufacturers have the option of carrying a line extension of lower quality than their current product
offering, products which consumers view as equals to store brands. We follow up this model with one
where an external manufacturer is available to the retailer to produce store brands, negating the use of
the manufacturers’ low quality line extensions. In this model the retailer currently carries an assortment of
store brands and manages the category itself, and is interested in outsourcing both its category management
responsibilities and the production of its store brands to a CC in an effort to consolidate its supply chain.
What we find is that the usefulness of category captainship for retailers who are looking to outsource both
their category management responsibilities as well as the production of their store brands depends largely
on the willingness of the manufacturers to market store brands as they are told. In our model, if the
manufacturers are willing to let the retailer decide how its store brand is to be marketed, then the retailer
is willing to use a CC; if not, then the retailer is only willing to use a CC for a very small set of conditions.
When this occurs we explore the possibility that the retailer may ask the external manufacturer to enter
into the bidding process for category captainship.
We conclude with Chapter 5 which summarizes our findings across these three essays and suggests areas






Category captainship is an emerging category management strategy wherein a retailer delegates control of the
day-to-day operations of a product category to one of the manufacturers whose products are carried within
that category. While category captainship was almost non-existent twenty years ago, it is commonplace
today to find it in use at retailers of all sizes: large retailers such as Wal-Mart, Target and Kmart (Raskin,
2003) as well as smaller regional retailers such as Colorado based natural food chain Wild Oats Markets
(Smyth, 1999) and Michigan based grocer Spartan Stores (Garry, 2005). There is also no size requirement
when it comes to which manufacturers can implement category captainship, as both large manufacturers who
compete across a variety of product categories (SC Johnson, Nestle Purina (Raskin, 2003), Kraft (Copple,
2002)), large manufacturers who dominate a narrower range of categories (Coca-Cola, Gillette (Raskin,
2003), Schick (Tenser, 1995)), and even small regional manufacturers (Pope & Talbot (Karolefski, 1995))
have been reported as participating in category captainship to some degree.
Using a game theoretical model of retail competition consisting of two manufacturers and a single retailer,
we quantify the effects of awarding category captainship to the highest bidding manufacturer where the lone
category management responsibility delegated to the CC is the setting of retail prices. Our goal in creating
this seemingly harsh environment is to learn if conditions exists where even under these stringent assumptions
manufacturers can either be minimally impacted by the introduction of a CC or potentially thrive. While
the absence of finding either of these conditions would not prove that the combination of the delegation of
retail pricing control to, and selection through an auction of, a CC is in fact anti-competitive, finding the
existence of these conditions may be refreshing to some of the critics who hold a negative view of category
captainship.
The key design element of our model is that we are assuming that the two manufacturers are asymmetric.
Symmetric players typically do not fair well in auction environments as their similarities are used against
them to ensure that they pay at least, or very close to, their true valuation of the item up for auction. While
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research exists which shows that under certain conditions two symmetric manufacturers can both profit from
the use of a CC (Bushey and Palekar, 2014b), in that particular study the manufacturers were also asked
to produce a store brand for the retailer, adding a layer of complexity absent from our model. While the
asymmetry in our model is only with respect to the number of consumers loyal to a particular brand, showing
that asymmetry alone is enough to counter some of the negative effects produced from the delegation of retail
pricing control and awarding category captainship through an auction is significant, because in industry, no
two manufacturers are perfectly symmetrical, so the conditions of our model may not be as bad in practice
as they are in theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2.2 we introduce and analyze our model, detailing the
specifics of both how the auction process works as well has how the manufacturers calculate the valuation
they each associate with being a CC. In §2.3 we discuss how the delegation of retail pricing control combined
with appointing a CC through an auction affects a product category, where the products in the category
are assumed to have relatively strong brands. §2.4 is of the same design as §2.3, but instead focuses on a
category where brands are assumed to be relatively weak. In §2.5 we conclude with a summary of our results
and discuss potential future avenues of category captain related research.
2.2 Model Design
Our game theoretic model of manufacturer competition consists of two manufacturers, M1 and M2 respec-
tively, who each sell a single substitutable product, N1 and N2 respectively, through a common retailer, R.
The products are differentiated by price and the value consumers assign to each manufacturers’ brand, N1
and N2 respectively, and the maximum value any consumer can assign to either brand is z. M1 and M2
sell their brands to R at wholesale prices w1 and w2 respectively, which are then marked-up by amounts m1
and m2 by R. In addition to brand importance, consumers also derive utility from the product category.
All consumers, regardless of their location on the brand importance line, will receive equal category utility
from the purchase of either brand, a value we have normalized to one. Therefore, the most any consumer
will be willing to pay for either N1 or N2 is z + 1.
There are two types of consumers in our model: consumers who are loyal to a single brand (“brand
loyals” or BL) and consumers who have no brand allegiance (“non-brand loyals” or NBL) and will purchase
whichever brand offers them the greatest utility, or neither, if both brands offer negative utility. The size
of the NBL population has been normalized to one and the size of the BL population is q. NBL’s brand
preference heterogeneity is modeled by placing them on a Hotelling’s line of length one. A NBL at point x
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on the brand preference line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) will assign a value of z(1− x) to N1 and a value of zx to N2. BLs
are willing to pay as much as z + 1 for their preferred brand and are unwilling to purchase the other brand
at any price. Manufacturer asymmetry is created by assigning all q BLs to M1. Other than the presence of
BLs, M1 and M2 are identical, and both have the same opportunity to serve NBLs. All consumer utility,
demand and profit functions can be found in Table 2.1.
Utility (For NBLs) Demand (For NBLs) Profit
u1 = 1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 d1 = 1z (z − w1 −m1 + 1) ΠM1 = (d1 + q)w1
u2 = 1 + zx− w2 −m2 d2 = 1z (z − w2 −m2 + 1) ΠM2 = d2w2
ΠR = (d1 + q)m1 + d2m2
Table 2.1: Utility, demand and profit functions
2.2.1 Analysis
Category captainship in our model is awarded through a bidding process where each manufacturers’ bid is a
statement of how much R should expect to earn if they let that manufacturer manage the category by setting
retail prices. The expected earnings of R are broken into two parts within the bid: how much R earns from
the sales of each brand as a function of m1 and m2, and how much the manufacturer submitting the bid is
willing to pay R for the right to manage the category. In this setting the auction is won by the manufacturer
who benefits the most (prior to any bid payment) from category captainship, but pays an amount ε (ε→ 0)
greater than its competitors benefit. As a result of manufacturer asymmetry, each manufacturer may be
able to offer R different maximum amounts of expected profit and therefore may not be required to offer
R the full amount which they could generate for them. Letting Γ1 and Γ2 represent the maximum amount
that M1 and M2 would be willing to offer R respectively, when Γ1 > Γ2, M1 will be able to secure the role
of CC by bidding only Γ2 + ε = Γ2, and likewise when Γ2 > Γ1, M2 will be able to secure the role of CC
by bidding only Γ1 + ε = Γ1. If Γ1 = Γ2, then both manufacturers will be forced to submit matching bids,
resulting in R selecting one manufacturer at random to serve as the CC at a cost to that manufacturer equal
to the maximum amount it is willing to offer R for the role.
In order to calculate Γ1 and Γ2 we solve the game twice, once letting M1 function as the CC and again
letting M2 assume the role. Each game is solved through backwards induction where the CC maximizes
the profit associated with all decision variables it controls and the NCC maximizes its profit as described in
Table 2.1. The complete list of constraints, resulting profit functions and Γs associated with each player can
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be found in Table 3.2 where the superscripts 1 and 2 denote values associated with M1 and M2 managing
the category respectively. While the CCs’ objective functions contain m1 and m2, their respective profit
M1 is CC (M2 is NCC) M2 is CC (M1 is NCC)
Maximize (d1 + q)(w1 +m1) + d2m2 (d1 + q)m1 + d2(w2 +m2)
Subject to
d1 + d2 ≤ 1 d1 + d2 ≤ 1
m1 = 0 m2 = 0
w1 ≤ 1 + z d1 ≥ 0
Where




Π1M2 = d2w2 Π
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M1
= (d1 + q)w1
Π1R = (d1 + q)m1 + d2m2 Π
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+ Π1R −Π2M1 Γ2 = Π2M2 + Π2R −Π1M2
Table 2.2: Objective functions, constraints, profits and Γs when there is a CC
functions do not. As the goal of each manufacturer is to ultimately secure the role of CC, ignoring the
revenue associated with the sales of the NCC’s brand could potentially put their offers at a competitive
disadvantage as the other manufacturer could consider these sales and be able to make R a more lucrative
offer. Therefore, each manufacturer must consider the revenue associated with the sales of their competitor’s
brand in order to maximize the profit associated with sales of only their own brand. Additionally, when
solving their respective problems, neither manufacturer considers the values associated with the retail mark-
ups for their own brands (m1 and m2 for N1 and N2 respectively) and will set these values to zero. When
acting as CC, M1 and M2 do not need to set m1 and m2 respectively until after they know how much they
should bid. For example, if Π1R = Γ2, then M1 would be best served by keeping m1 = 0 as it does not
need to submit a more attractive bid in order to outbid M2 and become CC. Once Γ1 and Γ2 are known,
whichever manufacturer is able to submit the largest bid will then strategically set the retail mark-up for
the other brand as to ensure that its bid is equal to the opposing Γ. The constraint d1 + d2 ≤ 1 is required
to ensure that the total demand for NBLs never exceeds one. The constraints w1 ≤ 1 + z and d1 ≥ 0 are
required to ensure that the final retail price for N1 never exceeds 1 + z as this is the maximum amount BLs
are willing to pay for N1. Finally, after solving both games, Γ1 and Γ2 can be determined by the formulas
described in Table 3.2. Each Γ captures how much each manufacturer is willing to offer R while remaining
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indifferent between being selected as CC and not.
In addition to solving the two games where each manufacturer takes a turn managing the category, we
also solve the game where R manages the category in order to measure the impact that category captainship
has on the profits of the retailer, the manufacturer and the category, as well as on consumer surplus. Our
analysis for the remainder of this paper is separated into two parts: when consumers value the brands more
than the category (z > 1) and when the consumers value the category more than the brands (z < 1). While
both games were solved simultaneously for all values of z > 0, the resulting equilibrium behaved differently
on either side of z = 1, and for the benefit of the reader should be examined independently.
2.3 Consumers Value Brands More Than The Category (z > 1)
Figure 2.1 displays the areas containing unique equilibrium solutions which arise while solving these three
games. In the upper area for each game (RC , MD1 and M
E
2 ), there exists enough BLs that M1 is best served
by selling only to these consumers and does so by setting w1 = 1 + z. When the category is managed by
someone other than M1, for the areas adjacent to these upper areas (R
B and MD2 ), the reduced number
of BLs leads to M1 attempting to serve both its BLs and some NBLs, but is unable to do so as R and
M2 are best served by selling N1 only to BLs, and accomplish this by setting the retail mark-up for N1 to
m1 = 1 + z − w1. Below these areas, both M1 and the category manager set prices which allow a positive
amount of NBLs to purchase N1. In the areas R
A, MC1 and M
C
2 , there exists sufficient brand strength as to
warrant serving only a portion of the market for NBLs as opposed to serving the entire market. This is the
most market coverage R can attain when managing the category itself as a result of the double marginalized
pricing it faces while negotiating prices with M1 and M2. However, by delegating control of the category to
a CC, R is able to cover the entire market for NBLs, as CCs do not encounter double marginalized pricing







The reduction of double marginalization is the main driver behind which manufacturer will be able to
secure category captainship in each area (Figure 2.2). From Figure 2.2 we notice that M2 is able to secure




, while M1 is able to secure the position for




, the absence of double marginalization with respect to N2 allows M2
to increase its market share at the expense of N1. When this occurs, the best response from M1 is to shift
its focus from serving both NBLs and BLs to only serving its BLs in order to preserve the high margin on
N1 it currently enjoys. The decision by M1 to serve only its BLs does not guarantee that M2 will be CC,
as M1 is still capable of producing the largest bid and is able to secure category captainship in the region
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Figure 2.1: Areas of unique equilibrium solutions when R, M1 and M2 manage the category
z+1
3z < q <
z+1
2z , even though it elects to serve only its BLs. In this region, M1 elects to serve only its BLs
even when R manages the category, and as such M2 is only able to offer R the additional gains it produces
by serving additional NBLs who purchase its brand. As this is the lower part of the region where M1 exits
the NBL market, the lower values of q are such that M2 is not able to significantly increase the revenue from
consumers who purchase N2, even with the absence of double marginalization. M1 is able to significantly
increase its revenue from sales of N1 however, as M1 decides to re-enter the market for NBLs when it manages
the category, serving consumers that were previously unserved when R managed the category, resulting in
large values of Γ1. For larger values of q however, M1 is reluctant to serve a large portion of NBLs as a large
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Figure 2.2: Areas indicating which manufacturer will be selected as CC (z > 1)
q means that it can serve more BLs at a higher price than what many NBLs are willing to pay. M1’s pricing
strategy for large values of q is the same regardless of who is managing the category, and therefore M1 does
not experience a decrease in profits when M2 is CC. This leads to small values of Γ1 in this region as M1’s
profits are not significantly harmed by M2 when manages the category. This phenomena is illustrated in
Figure 2.3, which shows that for small values of q, Γ1 is larger than Γ2 as M1 is able to produce significant
gains from the loss of double marginalization with respect to N1, and as q increases the benefits from the
loss of double marginalization are much greater for M2 than they are for M1.
The only exception to M1 being able to outbid M2 for values of q <
z+1
2z is the intersection of the areas
MB1 and M
B




, neither manufacturer as NCC is able to serve as many NBLs as
they would like as the CC in both instances sets the respective retails prices for their brands independent of
the wholesale price set by the NCC in an attempt to leave the market for NBLs uncovered. When M1 is the
NCC in this region, M2 is able to capitalize on M1’s desire to cover the market by increasing m1, allowing M2
to produce more revenue from sales of the N1 than it would be able to otherwise
(





At the same time, M1’s desire to cover the market for NBLs leads to a reduction in how much it can produce
for itself as the NCC (which can be observed by the decreased slope of Π2M1 in Figure 2.3), leading to a
reduction in how much more M1 can earn than M2 as NCC
(




. M1’s losses are M2’s
gains however, as M2 is able to increase how much profit it can offer R (which can be observed by the
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Γ1 and Γ2 as a function of q (z > 1)
increased slope of Π2M2 + Π
2
R in Figure 2.3), narrowing the gap between how much M1 can offer as CC and
how much M2 can offer as CC
(






. All of these reductions taken together leads
to M1 being able to offer R a payment of size
(
Π1M1 −Π2M2
) − (Π2M1 −Π1M2) = 3q2z+2qz4 − q2 greater than
what M2 can offer R, which is equal to the extra revenue M2 is able to generate for R from the sales of N1,
leading to Γ1 = Γ2 and M1 ceasing to have an advantage over M2 for small values of q. These findings are
summarized in Proposition 2.1.





, M2 will be able to secure category captainship over M1 as the value M1 assigns to being
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, M1 will be
able to secure category captainship over M2 as being CC allows M1 to re-enter the market for NBLs, greatly
increasing the value it assigns to being CC. The only exception to this is when 4−2z3z < q <
3−z
3z . When this
occurs the pricing advantages afforded to M1 are negated by its inability to serve as many NBLs as it would
like, resulting in both M1 and M2 valuing the role of CC equally.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
2.3.1 Retailer, Manufacturer, Category and Consumer Gains
When the use of a CC leaves the market for NBLs uncovered, the question of retailer profitability is de-
termined by the size of the cash payment made by the CC to R. Since CCs manage NCC’s brand exactly
as R would (suffering from double marginalization), CCs are able to generate the exact same amount of
revenue from the sales of the NCC’s brand as R. As long as the NCC values the role of being CC more
than what R would have earned managing the category itself, R will profit from category captainship as





the NCC have a Γ equal to what R would earn without a CC. For these large values of q, M2 is selected as
the CC as M1 is indifferent towards category captainship as it elects to price at w1 = 1 + z, forcing m1 = 0





neither manufacturer will be indifferent towards category captainship as the loss of double marginalized
pricing with respect to their own brands allows them to increase their brands share of the market, and with
it their revenue, allowing R to profit from the practice of category captainship.
Manufacturer profitability is also determined by how the loss of double marginalization affects the share
of NBLs who purchase the NCCs brand. As a result of the category captain selection mechanism used, NCCs
only profit from category captainship if they are able to earn more when the other manufacturer manages
the category than when R does. As long as consumers value brands more than the category (z > 1), NCCs
are unable to profit as CCs either price the NCC’s brand the same as R does, or raise the mark-up on the
NCC’s brand so that the they can expand their share of NBLs who buy their own brand at the expense of
the NCC. Figure 2.4 highlights the areas where each manufacturer gains, breaks even, and loses as a result of
category captainship. From the right side of Figure 2.4 we observe that when M1 is the NCC they are able to
break even as there is no change in how its product is managed when category management responsibilities
switch from R to M2. The same is true for M2 when they are the NCC and q >
3−z
2z — in this area z and q
are sufficiently large such that both M1 as the CC and M2 as the NCC are best served by leaving the market
for NBLs uncovered, resulting in zero change to how M2’s brand is managed and therefore zero change in
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Figure 2.4: Areas depicting CC and NCC profitability (z > 1)
its profit. When q < 3−z2z and the market for NBLs becomes covered, M2 as NCC is no longer able to break
even from category captainship as M1 as CC is willing to lower its price for N1 and take consumers from
M2 as it has neither many BLs or a sufficiently strong brand which would warrant it keepings its price high.
The result of this is that M2 is forced to raise w2, resulting in it serving fewer NBLs are earning less.
With respect to the gains afforded to CCs, from the left side of Figure 2.4 we observe that M2 as CC is
always able to profit from managing the category as it is able to freely expand its share of the market for
NBLs as M1 elects to serve only its BLs when M2 is CC. When serving as CC, M1 is only able to profit from
its role as category manager when the manufacturers engage in minimal competition for NBLs, otherwise
the competition for NBLs will drive up the bids each manufacturer is willing to make, driving M1’s gains
from category captainship negative. From Figure 2.4 we can observe that there are two regions where M1 is
able to profit as CC. Both regions exist below the line q = 3−z2z , meaning that the market for NBLs is fully
covered and the manufacturers are actively competing for these consumers. In these regions, M1 is able to
remain profitable as z and q are such that the manufacturers are not aggressively competing for NBLs. In
the right most region
(
3−z




, there are either enough BLs paying a smaller z or less BLs paying
a larger z that M1 is content to derive the majority of its profit from BLs and does not feel the need to
aggressively court NBLs.
The left most region of M1’s profitability is a bit peculiar in that in exists entirely within a region that
is unprofitable for M1. The region in question consists of the upper portion of M
A
1 ∩MA2 and the lower
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portion of MA1 ∩MB2 . At the point q = 0, z = 1 in MA1 ∩MA2 , M1 is unable to achieve profitability as
there are neither enough BLs or sufficient brand strength to prevent the manufacturers from aggressively






11z = qAA there exist enough BLs such that M1 is able to profit by increasing
its price for N1 and concentrating only on those consumers. If M2 were to continue with the same pricing
strategy as q and z both continued to increase, then M1 would continue to be profitable. However, M2
switches its pricing strategy and begins to lower its wholesale price, forcing M1 to once again engage in
aggressive competition for NBLs. As long as q < 2
√
31+2z−17z2−14z+28
33z = qAB , the strength of the brands are
sufficiently low and do not warrant competition aggressive enough to drive M1’s profit negative. Above this
point however, the increased strength of the brands does warrant a level of competition which prevents M1
from remaining profitable. Results describing the profitability of the retailer and the manufacturers when
z > 1 are summarized in Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. When consumers value brands more than the category,




and profits from the use of a
CC otherwise;




, but is unable to profit otherwise;
(iii) The CC profits for an even larger range of q
(
q > 3−z3z and qAA < q <= qAB
)
, but is unable to profit
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The profitability of both the category and the consumers are not as sensitive to the degree of competition
for NBLs as the profitability of the manufacturers is. In order for the category to profit from category
captainship, the gains received by the CC resulting from the absence of double marginalization must be
greater than the loses the NCC faces when the CC is able to reduce the NCC’s share of the NBL market.









, the use of a CC improves









that category profit suffers as a result of
category captainship. With the market for NBLs being covered in this region, the only way for the CC to
increase its share of the market for NBLs is to steal them from the NCC by pricing B1 < B2. The affect
that this has on category profit is that NBLs who switch from N2 to N1 do so because they are able to
purchase N1 at a lower price than N2, so every NBL who switches brands gains while the category loses.
Figure 2.6 shows the changes in the market-share for NBLs when M1 is CC. From Figure 2.6 we observe
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Figure 2.5: Areas depicting category profitability when using a CC (z > 1)
Figure 2.6: Net changes in NBL market-share (z > 1)
that when z is very small (z = 1), there is a 25% change in share of NBLs served by M2. This occurs even
though the market for NBLs was uncovered when R managed the category, as it can be seen in Figure 2.6
that M1 is always able to increase the total number of NBLs who decide to make a purchase. As z increases
(z = 1.25 and z = 1.5), fewer NBLs defect from purchasing N2 as M1 is less inclined to aggressively compete
for NBLs as they are now willing to pay more for N1 due to the increase in z. The category’s loss is the
consumers’ gain however as consumers profit from category captainship for all values of z > 1 and q when
R elects to use a CC. Consumers benefit from CCs electing to increase the amount of NBLs served, as well
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as CCs aggressively competing for NBLs. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3. When consumers value brands more than the category,










as the CC entices consumers to switch brands by undercutting the NCC,
harming category profit in the process;
(ii) Consumers profit from the use of CC for all values of z > 1 and q, as CCs are able to leverage the loss
of double marginalization to both bring in new consumers as well as steal existing consumers from the
NCC by undercutting them.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
2.4 Consumers Value The Category More Than Brands (z < 1)
We now shift our focus to a market where consumers value the category more than the brands in the category.
Our analysis of this model is the same as one discussed in §3, where we solve the game three times, once
each where R, M1 and M2 manage the category. In addition to restricting the values of z to less than one,
for the purposes of this discussion we also restrict the values of q to 0 < q < 1. This is done for ease of
exposition as values of q > 1 and z < 1 produce no results which cannot be inferred from the results of
q < 1, but are significantly more involved. Large values of q are also unlikely to occur when z is small, as
weak brands typically do not have many brand loyal consumers. The areas containing unique equilibrium
solutions when z and q are less than one are displayed in Figure 2.7.
When consumers value brands less than the category, it is much easier for category managers to cover
the market for NBLs. The market for NBLs is covered in all areas except RD as this area possesses the
combination of both relatively strong brands and a relatively large number of BLs, which coupled with
double marginalization affecting both brands, leads to higher prices across the board and a portion of NBLs
remaining unserved. Free of double marginalization with respect to their own brands, when assuming the





M2 as the CC is able to serve all NBLs with its own brand as M1 prefers to serve only its BLs rather than
compete with M2 for NBLs when q >
2
5 . From Figure 2.8 we can see that M1’s preference for concentrating
only on its BLs in these areas reduces the value it assigns to category captainship, allowing M2 to secure




. Similar to when z > 1, we find that as q increases the
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Figure 2.7: Areas of unique equilibrium solutions when R, M1 and M2 manage the category (z < 1)
value that M1 assigns to being CC decreases, resulting in M2 being able to outbid M1 and secure category
captainship when q is relatively large.
Proposition 2.4. When consumers value the category more than the brands in the category, for sufficiently




, M2 will have more to lose than M1 when they are not CC as M1 is more easily
able to generate profit when it is the NCC as it concentrates on serving those consumers loyal to its brand.
When this occurs M2 will be selected as CC, otherwise M1 will be selected.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.8: Areas indicating which manufacturer will be selected as CC (z < 1)
2.4.1 Retailer, Manufacturer, Category and Consumer Gains
As expected, as z → 0 we find that neither manufacturer is able to profit as CC as the weakness inherent
in the brands amplifies the competition for NBLs to the point where both manufacturers are forced to bid
away any potential profits. However, for sufficiently large values of q and z
(
3−z







we find that M1 is able to profit when they are not the CC, a result absent from our findings when z > 1
(Figure 2.9). This raises the question of why doesn’t M1 execute the same pricing strategy which is successful
when M2 is CC, when R manages the category, as that strategy is more profitable and M2 has the same
pricing constraints with respect to N1 that R does? To understand how this occurs, let’s examine how N1 is
priced in the case where q = 1 when both R and M2 manage the category. Figure 2.10 displays the wholesale
price, retail mark-up and M1’s profit under these two management scenarios.
In order for M1 to profit as the NCC one of two things must occur: either it is able to increase its share
of the market for NBLs or it is able to sell to its BLs at a higher price. Since we know that M2 serves all of
the NBLs when they are CC, M1 must be able to achieve profitability through the raising of its wholesale
price. But how is M1 able to raise its wholesale price if M2 prices N1 with double marginalization just as
R does? The answer is that M2 is unable to price N1 with full double marginalization as a result of M2
covering the entire market for NBLs. What we mean by this is that when R sets m1, they do so with the
intention of selling N1 to a positive portion of NBLs. Knowing that R will price in this way, M1 is forced to
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Figure 2.9: Areas depicting CC and NCC profitability (z < 1)
Figure 2.10: w1, m1, ΠM1 , and ΠR when R and M2 manage the category (z < 1)
set a lower w1 than it would otherwise choose to do. However, when M2 manages the category, M1 knows
that M2 plans on serving all of the NBLs and therefore is able to raise w1 since M2 will be unable to set
m1 in such a way as to serve at less NBLs with N1, albeit at a higher price (left side of Figure 2.10). It is
not M1’s intention however to serve only its BLs, as throughout the region it sets w1 < 1 + z. As it is M2’s
decision for M1 to serve only its BLs, M2 has no choice but to lower m1 and price N1 at 1 + z (left side of
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Figure 2.10) resulting in M1 earning more when M2 manages the category than when R does (right side of
Figure 2.10).
M2 choosing to manage the category in this way also produces another unexpected result: for select
values of z and q, R loses money when using a CC. This can be seen in the right side of Figure 2.10, and
the entire region where R loses with a CC is shown in Figure 2.11. When M2 allows M1 to profit as the
Figure 2.11: Areas depicting retailer profitability when using a CC (z < 1)
NCC, the value M1 assigns to category captainship in this region decreases accordingly. As M2 only has to
offer R what M1 would be willing to offer R in this region in order to secure category captainship, M2 is
able to secure the position relatively inexpensively. While most of the time even this lesser bid is sufficient
to ensure retailer profitability, there does exist the possibility that M1 values category captainship so little
that R is forced to lose money when electing to use a CC. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.5
Proposition 2.5. When z < 1, for sufficiently large values of z and q, both manufacturers are able to profit
when acting as CC; however the role becomes unprofitable otherwise. While M2 is never able to profit when
it is the NCC, M1 is able to profit as the NCC as M2 elects to serve all NBLs, allowing M1 to raise its
wholesale price and achieve a level of profit which is unattainable when the retailer manages the category.
When this occurs, there exists the possibility that by allowing the NCC to profit, the bids submitted to the
retailer will not be sufficient as to ensure that the retailer profits from the use of a CC.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.12 shows the regions where the category and the consumers profit when a CC is used. From
Figure 2.12: Areas depicting category and consumer profitability (z < 1)
Figure 2.12 we can see that the profitability of the category when z < 1 is similar to that when z > 1: for
small values of z and q, the manufacturers aggressively compete for NBLs, allowing many NBLs to switch
brands and resulting in the category being less profitable with a CC than without. The profitability of the
consumers is dissimilar however, as we observe conditions where consumer profitability decreases when a
CC is used. Once again this is the result of M2 as CC electing to serve all of the NBLs and M1 as the
NCC electing to raise its wholesale price. When z is very small and q is close to one, the market for NBLs
is covered both with and without a CC. CCs typically increase consumer surplus by enticing consumers
to switch brands by offering lower prices through the elimination of double marginalization. In this region
however, consumers are electing to switch from N1 to N2 because N1 is no longer available to NBLs as it
is being priced at 1 + z. While all of the NBLs who switch to N2 are receiving positive gains in surplus as
the price of N2 is still low enough for them to consider purchasing it, all of the BLs are now forced to pay
their full valuation of the product, a price they did not have to pay previously as N1 was priced to attract
some NBLs to purchase it. The resulting losses in consumer surplus suffered by the BLs is enough to drive
the net consumer surplus for the entire market of consumers negative. These results are summarized in
Proposition 2.6.
Proposition 2.6. When consumers value the category more than the brands,
(i) Category profit increases for sufficiently large values of z and q, as the CCs are able to bring in new
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consumers and charge existing brand loyal consumers a higher price;
(ii) Consumers profit from the use of CC for almost all values of z < 1 and q, but there exist certain small
values of z and large values of q where the higher prices being charged to brand loyal consumers result
in the surplus lost by these consumers being greater than the surplus gained from the non-brand loyal
consumers who switch brands, driving the net surplus for the entire market of consumers negative.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
2.5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we created a model of category captainship under what are assumed to be some of the harshest
conditions manufacturers can expect to encounter — the delegation of retail price setting and the awarding of
category captainship through an auction. As expected we uncovered conditions where category captainship
can lead to a decrease in profits for all manufacturers, the CC included. But we also highlighted conditions
where not only can the manufacturer assuming the role of CC profit, but the “losing” manufacturer who is
relegated to the role of NCC can also profit. In an auction setting such as the one we designed, the ability of
a manufacturer to profit from category captainship is a function of both how much they value being CC as
well as how much their rival values the same role. One manufacturer alone benefiting greatly from control of
the category is not sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure that the retailer is able to earn more by relinquishing
its control of the category. Both manufacturers need to be able to experience substantial gains from the role
of CC in order for the auction to serve its intended purpose of forcing the manufacturers into submitting
large bids which then can lead to the process being a worthwhile endeavor for the retailer.
Future category captain related research should study the effects that other forms of manufacturer
asymmetry have on the profitability of the manufacturers and the retailer. It is in the best fiscal interest of
the retailer to structure the role of the CC in such a way that manufacturers are able to generate significant
increases after assuming control of managing the category. Future category captain related research should
study what is the best combination of responsibilities to delegate to specific types of manufacturers. It is
possible that some manufacturers may not see much of a change in how they value category captainship
when responsibility “A” is delegated, but may see a very large change when instead responsibility “B” is.
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Chapter 3
Category Captainship With In-Store
Marketing Activities
3.1 Introduction
Increasingly retailers are willing to let select manufacturers, referred to as “category captains” (CC), oversee
the day-to-day operations of a variety of category management activities ranging from the setting of retail
prices to the planning and execution of in-store marketing activities (IMA), a practice known as “category
captainship”. The increased use of category captainship, coupled with a trend towards assigning more
than just pricing responsibility to CCs, has raised regulatory concerns about competitive fairness, strategic
concerns about the level of delegation and tactical concerns about CC selection. It is commonly believed that
the CC, because of being in control of many retailing levers, gets an unfair advantage over its competition
and is therefore able to significantly benefit from CC designation. So much so that CCs are often willing
to pay for CC designation and retailers are beginning to demand payments. With these issues in mind,
the main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of delegating to a CC simultaneous control of
both retail price setting and IMA allocation. How does such delegation of multiple category management
responsibilities affect competitive fairness? What effect does this have on the profits of the retailer, the CC,
competing manufacturers and the category? Do consumers suffer because of this practice?
To investigate these issues, we construct a game theoretical model of category captainship consisting of
two manufacturers and a single retailer, wherein the retailer uses a first-price auction and the manufacturers
bid the amount of profit they will guarantee the retailer if they are appointed as CC. The retailer may
delegate control of retail price setting alone or both pricing and IMA execution. For IMA we consider two
types of activities: brand marketing (BM) activities, which promote one brand at the expense of all remaining
brands, and category marketing (CM) activities, which are designed to promote the entire category and help
all brands within the category equally. As the primary focus of this paper is the delegation of multiple
responsibilities, we consider four delegation scenarios where the retailer always delegates control of retail
pricing and one of the following combinations of IMA execution: neither BM nor CM, only BM, only CM
or both BM and CM. For each scenario we measure the impact that category captainship has on retailer
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profit, manufacturer profit for both the CC and the non-category captain (NCC), total category profit and
consumer welfare. By studying these four scenarios we are also able to measure the impact of increasing
the number of responsibilities delegated. Our main contribution is that our study is the first to examine
the delegation of multiple category management responsibilities from a retailer to a CC; previous work has
studied the delegation of pricing alone (Wang et al., 2003; Kurtulus and Toktay, 2011; Misra et al., 2009) or
the delegation of a single non-pricing category management responsibility while the retailer retains control
of setting retail prices (Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011; Subramanian et al., 2010; Kurtulus et al., 2013).
In addition to our main contribution, this paper also contributes to the literature in two other areas. The
first is the method we use for CC selection. Previous work in category captainship has taken one of several
approaches with respect to CC selection. The most common approach is for the retailer and the CC to
form an alliance, where one manufacturer is chosen at random to act as CC and is tasked with maximizing
the profit for the alliance, where the specifics of how the profit is shared amongst the alliance members
is determined exogenously (Wang et al., 2003; Kurtulus and Toktay, 2011; Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011).
Selecting a CC in this manner may be problematic for the retailer as once the CC has been selected the
retailer’s leverage in extracting the largest possible share of the profit is reduced; retailers concerned with
maximizing their own profit should negotiate the specifics of the profit sharing agreement upfront before
selecting the CC. Our method builds upon this approach by endogenizing the specifics of the profit sharing
agreement during the bidding process. By including all potential CC candidates in the discussion regarding
payment structures the retailer improves their bargaining position.
Another approach, used by Kurtulus et al. (2013), is to model CC selection through an auction pro-
cess, but one where the manufacturers’ bids are in the form of total category sales. In our approach the
manufacturer selected as CC is only concerned with maximizing their own profit and not the category as a
whole. This allows us to observe if the CC acts opportunistically and not in the best interest of the category,
a common concern of many opponents of category captainship (Morgan et al., 2007). A final approach is
the one taken by Subramanian et al. (2010), where they use an auction to solicit from manufacturers bids
containing what amount of IMA they would be willing to provide if selected as CC. However, their approach
differs significantly from ours as they allow the retailer to accept both proposals. This is not possible in our
model as the ownership of retail price setting cannot be shared among manufacturers. To our knowledge
our study is the first to auction off the setting of retail prices, which research has found to be the most
important channel decision (Choi, 1991; Lee and Staelin, 1997).
Our final contribution is a better understanding of the effect of IMA delegation on the amounts and
types of IMA used, and on category profit and consumer welfare. With respect to how we model IMA, the
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work most similar to ours is Subramanian et al. (2010). The key difference between their work and ours is
that they do not allow the retailer to implement any IMA — only manufacturers have the ability to execute
either BM or CM. Since we allow the retailer in our model to implement either type of IMA, we are able to
create a baseline for the amount and types of IMA the retailer would choose to use. We are then able to see
how the presence of a CC changes the use of IMA, and affects category profit and consumer welfare.
Our main result is that under most conditions the retailer benefits from category captainship at the
expense of both manufacturers and the category. This occurs because the manufacturers get caught in a
prisoner’s dilemma when submitting their bids for category captainship resulting in both manufacturers
earning the same amount regardless of their role. Category captainship eliminates double marginalization
for the CC’s brand, and through this elimination the CC is able to offer a more competitive price than the
NCC and extract additional surplus from the consumers. However, the CC is unable to profit from this
surplus as any gains produced by category captainship are transferred from the CC to the retailer in the
form of profit guarantees during the bidding process. The more responsibilities that are delegated, the more
opportunity the CC has to grow the category. As with the delegation of a single responsibility, the delegation
of multiple responsibilities leads to the manufacturers again getting caught in a prisoner’s dilemma which
transfers all of the gains back to the retailer. Surprisingly, we find that consumer welfare actually increases.
Through the elimination of double marginalization the CC is able to provide consumers who purchase their
brand with extra utility, increasing the aggregate consumer welfare. This comes at a cost however, as the
extra utility provided to the consumers results in reduced category profits.
With respect to IMA, we find that when the category is managed by the retailer, the retailer uses the
threat of BM allocation as a means to force the manufacturers to lower their wholesale prices but never
actually implements any BM. However, when BM is delegated to a CC, the CC undertakes BM activities
to benefit itself, but ends up causing further losses for both manufacturers. Category losses, however, are
reduced as BM is a more cost efficient method to entice consumers to switch brands than lowering prices.
Interestingly, we find that under retailer self-management the retailer is hesitant to use CM as doing so gives
the manufacturers an opportunity to increase their wholesale prices in anticipation of CM usage. When CM
is delegated to a CC, the CC is not as hesitant as the retailer to use CM as the CC is able to discourage the
NCC from raising their wholesale price through the strategic setting of retail prices. The additional use of
CM by the CC increases the retailer’s profit to levels which were unattainable when the retailer self-managed
the use of CM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §3.2 we review the relevant literature concerning both
in-store marketing and category captainship. In §3.3 we introduce and analyze our model. In §3.4 we discuss
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how category profit and consumer welfare are impacted by delegation. In §3.5 we conclude with a summary
of our results.
3.2 Literature Review
Category captainship is emerging as the dominant category management strategy in response to the ever
increasing number of product categories being carried by retailers today. Large retailers such as Wal-
Mart, Target and Kmart are known to use CCs (Raskin, 2003), as are smaller regional retailers such as
Colorado based natural food chain Wild Oats Markets (Smyth, 1999) and Michigan based grocer Spartan
Stores (Garry, 2005). Large manufacturers who compete across many categories such as SC Johnson, Nestle
Purina (Raskin, 2003) and Kraft (Copple, 2002) have acted as CCs in the past, as have large specialized
manufacturers who compete across a narrower range of categories such as Coca-Cola, Gillette (Raskin, 2003)
and Schick (Tenser, 1995). Even smaller manufacturers such as regional paper products manufacturer Pope
& Talbot (Karolefski, 1995) have acted as CC in the past. In a 2003 survey of retailers and manufacturers,
retailers reported an estimated 14% increase in sales as a result of category captainship, while manufacturers
reported an estimated 8% increase (Raskin, 2003).
While the execution of category captainship may take many different forms, all variants of the process
require two primary decisions to be made: which category management responsibilities will be delegated to
the CC and how will the CC be selected. The delegation of category management responsibilities to a CC
has the potential to increase channel coordination, streamline decision making and improve the profitability
of a category (Alaimo, 2007; Raskin, 2003). The two main types of responsibilities delegated are control
of retail price setting (Phipps, 2001; Wang et al., 2003; Kurtulus and Toktay, 2011; Misra et al., 2009)
and the execution of demand enhancing services. Specific types of demand enhancing activities previously
studied are the design and implementation of IMA (Subramanian et al., 2010), the decision of which product
assortment to carry (Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011; Kurtulus et al., 2013) and the allocation of shelf-space
(Subramanian et al., 2010). As discussed in §1, the main contribution of this paper is that we are the first
to study the delegation of both control of retail pricing and the execution of demand enhancing services, in
the form of IMA.
With respect to the selection of a CC, the two main approaches found in the literature are for the retailer
to appoint one manufacturer as CC without allowing the other manufacturers to compete for the position
and for the retailer to allow all manufacturers to compete for the position by holding some form of an auction.
When modeling CC selection without competition, retailers either select a manufacturer at random (when
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it is assumed that all manufacturers are symmetric with respect to their category management abilities)
(Wang et al., 2003), select the manufacturer with the most relevant information pertaining to the category
(Kurtulus and Toktay, 2011; Kurtulus and Nakkas, 2011), or select a manufacturer based on their size
relative to the other manufacturers (Misra et al., 2009). In all of these approaches, the retailer and the CC
enter into an alliance where the goal of the CC is to maximize total alliance profit.
The alternative approach is for the retailer to allow the manufacturers to compete for CC designation
through an auction (Subramanian et al., 2010; Kurtulus et al., 2013). This approach is consistent with
recent observations from industry, where it has been found that manufacturers are approaching retailers
and offering to pay for CC designation (Merrefield, 1996). A 1996 survey by the Silvermine Consulting
Group reported that 21% of manufacturers had paid for the right to be chosen as a CC (Tenser, 1996). At
the time of the survey, manufacturers reported that requests from retailers for payments to secure category
captainship had been rapidly increasing. The values of the payments ranged anywhere from $10,000 to
$100,000. The practice of manufacturers paying retailers for category captainship is controversial and adds
to the already existing debate about the competitive consequences of category captainship.
3.2.1 In-Store Marketing Activities (IMA)
Similar to Subramanian et al. (2010), we assume that there are two distinct types of IMA — IMA that is
designed to promote one specific brand (BM) and IMA that is designed to promote all brands within the
category equally (CM). While the academic literature regarding the effects of each type of IMA is limited,
there are empirical findings which indicate that our modeling assumptions regarding both BM and CM are
accurate. van Heerde et al. (2003) found that in markets which are not fully covered, in-store promotional
activities directed at a single brand increase sales for the focal brand by attracting both new consumers
to the market and enticing existing consumers to switch brands. Inman and McAlister (1993) found that
while there were differences across categories with respect to consumers’ responses to CM, within a category
the consumers’ responses were consistent. We restrict the use of marketing activities in this paper to in-
store activities, excluding other forms of out-of-store marketing (e.g. newspaper advertisements or direct
mailings). In-store promotions such as end-of-aisle or within-aisle displays have been found to be the most
powerful form of short-term marketing promotions (Wilkinson et al., 1982).
To simplify our analysis we study only those category types which are most likely to benefit from the
use of IMA. The academic literature is fairly consistent when it comes to identifying the types of categories
that benefit the most from IMA: categories containing brands for which the consumers do not have a strong
preference, i.e. categories consisting of commodity products. Previous studies have indicated that categories
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containing brands with strong “franchises” do not see any significant increase in purchase probability after
the use of IMA (Lattin and Bucklin, 1989), categories containing brands which consumers rate as “superior”
are less likely to be influenced by in-store promotions (Cavallo and Temares, 1969), and mature categories
respond better to the use of IMA than growing ones (Chevalier, 1975). Additionally, leading national brands
tend to be less responsive than other national brands to IMA (Bemmaor and Mouchoux, 1991; Abratt et al.,
1995) and the effects of IMA decrease as brand loyalty increases (Abratt and Goodey, 1990).
3.2.2 Regulatory Concerns
Category captainship is not without its share of detractors. Opponents of category captainship worry that
giving a manufacturer partial or full control of a retail product category gives that manufacturer too much
influence over the category, influence they might use to create an unfair competitive advantage over their
rivals (Gooner et al., 2011). The term “manufacturer opportunism” is used to describe potential behavior
on behalf of a CC that could lead to reduced profits for other manufacturers in the category as well as
the retailer itself, and in extreme cases could lead to other manufacturers being excluded from the market
altogether (Morgan et al., 2007). Rival manufacturers also fear that CCs will be able to use their position
to amass a strategic information advantage as they will be closer to point-of-sale data and the consumers.
Opponents of category captainship are also concerned that a CC will be able to significantly increase the
operating costs of their competitors, potentially increasing these costs to the point where competitors may
be excluded from the market entirely (Desrochers et al., 2003). The United States Supreme Court recently
upheld a jury decision in the case of Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., which ordered U.S. Tobacco
to pay Conwood $1.05 billion for allegedly using their role as CC to exclude Conwood’s products from stores
(Wright, 2009). Currently there are cases containing allegations of CC abuse making there way through
the court system involving the product categories of carbonated sodas, cranberries, smokeless tobacco and
tortillas (Desrochers et al., 2003). Regulators are also concerned about the potential reduction in consumer
welfare brought on by category captainship, as manufacturers other then the CC may be forced to raise their
prices or leave the market completely.
3.3 Model Design and Analysis
Our game theoretical model of manufacturer competition consists of two symmetric manufacturers, M1 and
M2 respectively, who each sell a single substitutable product through a common retailer, R. The products
are differentiated by price and the value consumers assign to the importance of each manufacturers’ brand,
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N1 and N2 respectively, where the maximum value any consumer can assign to either brand is z. M1 and
M2 sell their respective brands to R at wholesale prices w1 and w2, which are then marked-up by R by m1
and m2 for N1 and N2 respectively. The size of the consumer population has been normalized to one and
the consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their preference for the two brands. Consumers’ brand
preference heterogeneity is modeled by placing them on a Hotelling’s line of length one. A consumer at point
x on the line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) will assign a value of z(1− x) to N1 and a value of zx to N2. In addition to brand
importance, consumers also derive utility from the product category (using the toothpaste category as an
example, all brands of toothpaste offer consumers utility through the removal of plaque and the feeling of a
fresh, clean mouth). All consumers, regardless of their location on the brand importance line, will receive
equal category utility from the purchase of either brand, a value we have normalized to one. As discussed in
§2, in order to focus our analysis only on those product categories most likely to use and benefit from IMA,
we will restrict the possible values that z can take to the range [0, 1] or only categories where the consumers’
preference for either brand does not exceed the strength of the category.
3.3.1 Consumer Utility and Game Sequence
In addition to the brand and the category, consumers in our model will also receive utility from the types
and amounts of IMA present when they make their purchase decision. BM is defined to enhance one brand
at the expense of the other. Letting s1 represent the amount of BM used, consumers who purchase N1 will
receive additional utility equal to s1 while consumers who purchase N2 will receive utility equal to −s1. We
restrict the amount of BM that may be used to the range [−z, z] which prevents the use of BM from negating
the importance of the brand for the consumers who value brand importance the most. Positive values of s1
indicate that BM efforts are directed towards N1 and negative values of s1 indicate that the BM efforts are
directed towards N2. With respect to CM, all consumers will receive utility equal to s2, the amount of CM
used, when they purchase either brand. The amount of s2 that may be used is restricted to the range [0, 1]
which prevents the use of CM from adding more utility to the category than is already present.
We let c represent the cost parameter associated with the implementation of either type of IMA. We
choose to use the same cost parameter for both types of IMA as the effort required to design and build, for
example an end-of-aisle display, is independent of whether the display is for either an entire category or a
single brand — there are physical limitations such as floor and shelf-space which limit the potential scope
of IMA. Further, we assume that the cost of implementing either BM or CM is quadratic, i.e. the costs are
given by cs21 and cs
2
2 for BM and CM respectively.
In order to capture the effects of increasing the number of category management responsibilities delegated,
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we will analyze the following four unique IMA usage scenarios: (1) neither BM nor CM is used, (2) only BM
is used, (3) only CM is used, and (4) both BM and CM are used together. The consumers’ utility functions
associated with the purchase of each brand for each of these four scenarios are displayed in Table 4.1.
Types of IMA Used Utility From Purchasing N1 Utility From Purchasing N2
No BM nor CM 1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 1 + zx− w2 −m2
BM Only 1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s1 1 + zx− w2 −m2 − s1
CM Only 1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s2 1 + zx− w2 −m2 + s2
Both BM and CM 1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s1 + s2 1 + zx− w2 −m2 − s1 + s2
Table 3.1: Consumer utility functions by IMA usage and brand
We assume that R selects a CC through a first-price auction where each manufacturer submits a bid for
how much profit they are willing to guarantee R if selected as CC. This approach differs from previous work
where it has been assumed that R either sets a reservation price which must be eclipsed by the winning
bid (Kurtulus et al., 2013) or that the CC will maximize the sum of its profit and that of R (Subramanian
et al., 2010). We do this so that we may observe any manufacturer opportunism which may exist after the
selection of the CC. In practice retailers have the ability to solve these games and become aware of when
manufacturer opportunism would occur and lead to a reduction in their profit. Solving these games in the
absence of a reservation price allows us to highlight conditions where R should use a reservation price when
announcing the auction for category captainship. When announcing the auction, R indicates which types of
IMA may be implemented by the CC. After R announces the auction, M1 and M2 submit bids for how much
profit they are willing to guarantee R if selected as the CC and R appoints the manufacturer who submits
the largest bid as the CC. If the bids are equal R appoints the CC at random. For the remainder of this
paper, and without loss of generality, since the manufacturers are symmetric, we assume that R appoints
M1 as the CC and that M2 functions as the NCC. After the selection of the CC has been announced, the
NCC sets its wholesale price and then the CC sets its wholesale price, both retail prices, and implements
any permissible types of IMA. The complete game sequence for all four scenarios is displayed in Table 3.2.
3.3.2 Desirability of Category Captainship
Since the primary focus of this paper is how the increased delegation of category management responsibilities
affects all players involved (as well as the category and the consumers), we first quantify how each player
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1. R announces a first-price auction for category captaincy which includes which types of IMA may be
implemented by the CC
2. M1 and M2 each submit a bid indicating how much profit they are willing to guarantee R if selected
as the CC
3. R designates the manufacturer submitting the highest bid as CC (if the two bids are equal R selects
one manufacturer at random)
4. The NCC sets its wholesale price
5. The CC sets its wholesale price and both retail prices and implements any permissible type(s) of IMA
6. Consumers purchase the brand offering the highest positive utility
Table 3.2: Game sequence for each of our four scenarios
profits in each game when R elects to manage the category itself, as opposed to using a CC. Using backwards
induction, we solve each game twice — once when R manages the category and again when the CC does. In
order to calculate how much profit each manufacturer could guarantee the retailer, we determine how much
the CC could earn when delegated control of the category.
When deciding how much to bid for category captainship, each manufacturer need only bid slightly more
than the maximum that the other manufacturer is willing to bid in order to submit the winning bid. Since
the manufacturers are symmetric, both manufacturers will manage the category in the same way, resulting
in matching bids for the role of CC. The maximum either manufacturer is willing to bid is the amount
which makes them indifferent between being selected as the CC and not. Therefore, the equilibrium bids are
calculated by taking the difference between the profit earned by the CC and the profit earned by the NCC.
One important question needs to be addressed — what consideration does the CC pay to the retail price
of the NCC? If the CC is concerned with strictly maximizing its own profit, then it will price the NCC out of
the market by setting a very high retail price for the NCC’s brand. However, if either manufacturer submits
a bid which ignores the sales of the other manufacturer’s brand, the other manufacturer would be able to
secure category captainship by submitting to R a more lucrative bid which considers the sales of its rival’s
brand. Therefore, in equilibrium both manufacturers must consider the sales of the other’s brand when
determining their bidding strategy. This results in the CC optimizing a profit function of the demand for
its brand times its wholesale price and mark-up, plus the demand for the NCC’s brand times its mark-up,
minus the costs of implementing IMA, when applicable
(
ΠCC = (w1 +m1)d1 +m2d2 − cs21 − cs22
)
. The bids
made to R will be of the form ΠR = m1d1 +m2d2.
Figure 3.1 displays the areas containing unique equilibria for each scenario when either R or the CC
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Figure 3.1: Areas of unique equilibrium solutions when R or the CC manages the category
manages the category. The grey lines in Figure 3.1 represent unique equilibria which disappear when the CC
manages the category as opposed to R. These equilibria disappear as a result of the elimination of double
marginalized pricing for the CC’s product. Appendix B.1 gives further details about each of these regions
and their associated equilibrium solutions. These solutions are used in the proofs of our propositions found
in Appendix B.2.
In the presence of double marginalization, each scenario contains an equilibrium solution where the
manufacturers are able to leverage the strength of the brands and the high cost of IMA in order to exert
pricing control over R when R manages the category. As the strength of their brands decline and the cost
of IMA implementation becomes more affordable, pricing control shifts from the manufacturers to R. In
the absence of double marginalization, the CC is able to exert pricing control over the NCC regardless of
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brand strength or the cost of IMA, resulting in one fewer equilibrium for each game and thereby increasing
the earning potential for the CC. However, as a result of manufacturer symmetry and the bidding process
required to secure category captainship, both manufacturers get trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma wherein
they are forced to surrender their potential gains to R during the bidding process, resulting in neither the
CC nor the NCC being able to profit from category captainship. Under category captainship, the CC will
transfer all of the additionally generated profit to R, which leaves R always better off when using a CC. In
fact, we find that under most conditions the CC will end up transferring to R more profit than what was
produced by category captainship, resulting in both manufacturers being financially harmed by category
captainship. Finally, we find that R’s gains and the manufacturers losses are increasing in the number of
category management responsibilities delegated. These results are summarized in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. In all cases,
(i) The retailer always benefits from the use of a category captain, even without using a reservation pricing
during the auction;
(ii) Both the category captain and the non-category captain are adversely affected as the category captain
surrenders any benefit of its category captain designation, and almost always more, due to a prisoner’s
dilemma;
(iii) The retailer’s gains and the manufacturers losses increase as more responsibilities are delegated.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.3.3 Delegation of Price and BM (No CM Permitted)
To isolate the effects of BM and CM we separately consider each type of IMA before considering them
together. To evaluate the impact of delegating control of both retail pricing and BM allocation we use two
separate baselines for comparison: how the market functions when the CC is delegated retail pricing control
but not BM, and how the market functions when R self-manages the category and elects to use BM. This
leads to the examination of four separate variations of our game: (1) where R self-manages the category and
elects not to BM, (2) where R self-manages the category and elects to use only BM, (3) where R elects to
delegate control of only retail pricing, and (4) where R elects to delegate control of both retail pricing and
BM (Figure 3.2). The effects of delegating control of only pricing are highlighted in Proposition 3.1: when R
elects to delegate control of only retail pricing, R benefits from both the CC’s ability to more efficiently price








(3) CC without 
any IMA 
delegation
(4) CC with only 
BM delegated
Figure 3.2: Game variations for analyzing BM delegation
This results in the NCC being forced to lower its wholesale price in order to compete with the CC’s ability
to more efficiently price its own brand.
But what are the effects when the retailer decides to manage the category itself and use BM? We find that
when R manages the category and uses BM, it is willing to allocate BM towards whichever manufacturer







Since M1 and M2 are symmetric, the manufacturers end up offering the same wholesale price, which results
in R electing to not to use any BM. While no BM is actually implemented, the threatened use of BM by R
forces both manufacturers to lower their wholesale prices from what they would offer in the absence of BM.
Manufacturers lower their prices for two reasons — to seek BM by being the lower wholesale price; and to
offset the adverse effects of BM if it is allocated to their rival. By how much the manufacturers lower their
wholesale prices depends on c, the unit cost of implementing BM. When c is small, R can inexpensively direct
large amounts of BM towards either manufacturer, thereby forcing the manufacturers to drastically lower
their prices. However, as c increases, R’s threat of using large amounts of BM becomes less credible and
manufactures make only small price adjustments to compensate for the BM. This can be seen in Figure 3.3
which shows the specific case of wholesale prices when z = 0.8. When R self-manages the category and
threatens the use of BM, wholesale prices are less than or equal to the prices set with no threat of BM.
Notice that very small values of c drive wholesale prices to zero (potentially driving manufacturers out of
the market). Conversely when c is large, R cannot credibly threaten the use of BM and the manufacturers
maximize their wholesale prices.
The situation is somewhat different when R delegates pricing and BM to a CC. Figure 3.3 shows the






. Notice that the CC will actually
implement BM in its own favor as long as c is sufficiently high. For very low values of c the threatened use
of BM is sufficient to drive the NCC’s wholesale price to zero and therefore does not necessitate the use of
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Figure 3.3: Changes in wholesale prices and s1 when pricing control and BM are delegated in the absence
of CM and z = 0.8
BM. For larger values of c, the CC implements BM as a decreasing function of c and the NCC compensates
by lowers its wholesale price. Notice also that delegation to a CC results in wholesale prices that are lower
than under retailer self-management. The further lowering of the NCC’s wholesale price negatively affects
its profit, and in turn the CC’s profit, as the CC will surrender any excess profits in the biding process
to obtain category captaincy. In turn R benefits even more by delegating both pricing and BM. This is
summarized in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. For categories where BM can be implemented,
(i) Under retailer self-management, the amount of BM is a linear function of (w1 − w2), which causes the
manufacturers to lower their wholesale prices. Due to symmetry no BM is actually implemented;
(ii) When pricing and BM are delegated, it is profitable for the CC to implement BM in its favor. The NCC
reacts by further lowering its wholesale price;
(iii) Because of the prisoner’s dilemma faced by the manufacturers the CC surrenders all of its gains from
implementing BM to the retailer to win CC designation. The retailer gains by delegating pricing and
BM to the CC.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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3.3.4 Delegation of Price and CM (No BM Permitted)
Unlike BM, which favors one manufacturer over another, CM promotes both brands equally. The resulting
increase in consumer utility allows for higher retail prices for both brands. The increased profit potential does
not go unnoticed by the manufacturers. Depending on the value of z, the brand importance, manufacturers




, the manufacturers face
a prisoner’s dilemma — both can gain by raising their wholesale prices but are prevented from doing so by
the threat that the other manufacturer may undercut by not raising its wholesale price. In this case, the
manufacturers do not raise their wholesale prices and the entire additional consumer surplus translates into
increased profit for R.
For z > 12 , that is, when brand importance is high, manufacturers react by raising their wholesale prices
to absorb the marginal increase in profits. Consider the case when z ≤ 12 , R implements the maximum
allowable amount of CM, s2 = 1, at a cost of cs
2
2 = c. This results in an added profit per customer of 1− c
that is available to be shared between R and the manufacturers. The manufacturers raise their wholesale
prices by 2z − 1 (from 1 to 2z). Therefore, as long as 2z − 1 < 1− c, it is profitable for R to use CM. Given
the increase in wholesale prices, the use of CM becomes unprofitable for R when z ≥ 2−c2 . Similarly, for the
case where c > 12 , it becomes unprofitable for R to use CM when z ≥ 4c+18c . Under these conditions, R is
unable to recoup the cost of CM implementation and will therefore choose to not make CM available.
Now consider the case when R delegates CM to the CC. For z ≤ 12 the CC mimics the retailer under
self-management, but since the cost is now borne by the CC, R makes an even larger profit. When z > 12 ,
regardless of the value c, we find that it is optimal for the CC to implement CM. This is in contrast to
the case when R self-manages the category and avoids the use of CM for certain large values of z and c.
Interestingly, the NCC maintains its wholesale pricing despite the implementation of CM by the CC. This
is because the CC is able to control the NCC’s desire to raise its wholesale price by strategically adjusting
the retail price for the NCC’s brand. Consequently, because of symmetry the CC surrenders any gains
from CM to R. Thus, R now benefits from CM for all values of z and c. These results are summarized in
Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3. For categories where CM can be implemented,
(i) Under self-management, the retailer judiciously implements CM based on the values of z and c. For
certain large values of z and c the retailer does not use any CM at all;
(ii) When pricing and CM are delegated, the CC elects to use CM for all values of z and c, thereby increasing
category profit.
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(iii) Because of a prisoner’s dilemma, the delegation of pricing and CM allows R to extract the entirety of
increased category profit without having to spend for category management.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.3.5 Delegation of Price, BM and CM
By using BM together with CM, the retailer will be able to increase the availability of CM as the use of





the manufacturers get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where they are forced to
set wholesale prices of zero or face the risk of R allocating BM towards their competition. For intermediate
values of brand strength
(
1
2c < z ≤ 1+c2c
)
the manufacturers will set non-zero wholesale prices, however, they
will remain unwilling to raise them as they continue to compete for BM. It is only when z > 1+c2c that the
brands are strong enough for the manufacturers to raise their wholesale prices and absorb some of the utility
provided by CM. Making CM available will remain profitable for R as long as z ≤ 4c+58c , a value greater than







. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where in the region between the
solid and dotted curves, using CM alone is not profitable but when used in conjunction with BM becomes
profitable for R.
Figure 3.4: Areas where the use of CM becomes unprofitable for R
While the use of BM and CM together increases the availability of CM, it is still not optimal for R to
use both BM and CM for all values of z and c as R maximizes its profit by using only BM when z > 4c+58c .
38
However, the delegation of both BM and CM results in CM being used for all values of z and c. The CC
is able to leverage its position to prevent the NCC from raising its wholesale price and absorbing all of the





towards its own brand, degrading the utility offered by the NCC’s brand, and forcing the NCC to
keep its wholesale price low. This also results in maximum profits for R, as the use of CM increases category
profit, which is entirely transferred to R during the bidding process. When R acts optimally by delegating
both BM and CM, it not only maximizes its own profit but also maximizes the use of IMA.
Proposition 3.4. By using BM and CM together, the retailer is able to make CM available for more values
of z and c as the use of BM forces manufacturers to exercise pricing restraint. However, when the brands
are sufficiently strong the retailer prefers not to use CM. The delegation of both BM and CM results not only
in maximum retailer profit, but also in maximum use of IMA.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.4 Consumer Utility and Category Profit
One of the questions at the center of the category captainship debate is “how does the practice of category
captainship impact consumers?” Opponents of category captainship fear that the CC can take advantage
of its position by pricing its rivals out of the market and decreasing consumer utility by decreasing the
number of options available to consumers. Proponents of category captainship argue the opposite: instead
of forcing their rivals out of the market and harming consumers, CCs will increase manufacturer competition
by being able to offer lower prices through the elimination of double marginalization which will ultimately
benefit consumers. We find that when R elects to self-manage the category, there is no increase in consumer
utility from the use of any combination of IMA as total consumer utility is equal to z4 for all four scenarios.
Because of symmetry, the manufacturers have identical responses regardless of the type of IMA used. This
results in an equally divided and covered market. Accordingly, any potential increase in consumer utility is
absorbed as margin by the retailer, leaving the net consumer surplus unchanged. For consumers to benefit
it is necessary that the market shares of the two manufacturers are unequal.
Asymmetry in market share can be affected by delegating pricing control to the CC. The resulting
elimination of double marginalization allows the CC to lower its retail prices significantly and serve three-
quarters of the market. This asymmetric market share results in an increase in consumer surplus. If in
addition CM is also delegated to the CC, while there is a change in the retailer’s profit, there is no further
change in consumer surplus as the CC continues to enjoy a three-quarters market share.
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Clearly the delegation of pricing supports the conjecture that consumers will benefit from competition
introduced by category captainship. If a little delegation is good, is more better? Unlike CM, the delegation
of BM has the potential to adversely affect the NCC’s product. For large values of z and c we find that
despite the use of BM, the optimal market share for the CC remains at three-quarters. In effect, any added
consumer utility is absorbed by the CC as profit, thereby leaving consumer surplus unchanged. Even more
surprisingly, for small values of z and c the CC now becomes so powerful that the NCC is reduced to setting
a wholesale price of zero.
One would expect the combination of weak brands and inexpensive BM to allow the CC to increase its
brand’s share of the market. But the CC is not interested solely in the sales of its own brand, they also
have an interest in selling the NCC’s brand as long as the mark-up is favorable. As z and c decrease, the
NCC is forced to decrease its wholesale price as the CC is increasingly able to allocate BM towards its own
brand. The NCC decreases its wholesale price until z = 12c , at which point it is forced to set a wholesale
price of zero. Once the NCC prices at zero, the CC no longer has any use for BM, as it can not extract a
lower price from the NCC. At this point the CC’s profits are maximized by setting equal retail prices for
the two brands, thereby dividing the market equally between the brands. This has an adverse affect on the
consumers leading to a decrease in consumer surplus. This case supports those who argue that category
captaincy can be detrimental for consumers.
While consumers may benefit from category captainship, how does the category itself fare? Category
profit is maximized when the market shares for the two brands are equal, but from our discussion above
we know that the delegation of pricing to a CC results in unequal market shares. This asymmetry in
market share, while beneficial for the retailer, adversely impacts category profits, which are reduced by z8 .
The reduction in category profit is reflected in lower profits for the two manufacturers and a concomitant
increase in consumer surplus. Can the delegation of IMA mitigate these adverse effects on category profit?
The delegation of both pricing and BM can help to reduce these losses in category profit. The CC can
gain market share one of two ways — either lower its price or provide BM. It turns out that BM activities
are a more cost effective way to gain market share than pricing discounts. Accordingly, category profit is
not as adversely affected as the use of BM reduces the losses in category profit from − z8 to − 2cz−116c . For
the special case z ≤ 12c , the CC does not need to use BM because the NCC sets a wholesale price of zero,
allowing the CC to coordinate the channel for both brands. Since the CC no longer has any pricing incentive
to favor its own brand, its profit is maximized by pricing the two brands equally, resulting in each brand
claiming half of the market and category profit not being negatively impacted.
Delegating only CM has no affect on category losses as CM does not induce lower wholesale prices from
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the NCC in the same way as BM does. For this reason, the delegation of both BM and CM has the same
affect on category losses as the delegation of only BM. However, if R does elect to use a CC, the delegation
of both BM and CM produces the most category profit of any delegation combination, as the CC is able to
leverage the cost savings provided by the use of BM and the increased utility provided by the use of CM.
Proposition 3.5. Under retailer self-management, the use of IMA does not increase consumer surplus.
Delegation of pricing causes an asymmetry in the market share of the two brands and therefore leads to an
increase in consumer surplus. Further delegation of BM or CM does not lead to any additional benefit for
the consumers. Moreover, for small values of z and c consumer welfare may actually decrease compared to
pricing delegation alone. Category profits, however, are always reduced when a CC is used. The delegation
of BM mitigates some of the category losses.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
3.5 Conclusion
IMA are powerful category management tools which a retailer can use to either grow the category (CM) or
affect market share (BM). However, the retailer can more successfully exploit IMA by delegating their use
to a CC. We show that while retailers and consumers are able to benefit from the delegation of pricing and
IMA, manufacturers, including the CC, and the category suffer. When IMA are delegated along with retail
pricing, manufacturers get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma — paying for more IMA but not profiting from
it. The fear of losing category captainship to its rivals causes each manufacturer to bid much more than
any extra profit that could be gained from the CC designation. For this reason the retailer always benefits
from the use of a CC, even without using a reservation price during the auction, while both the CC and
the NCC are adversely affected. Thus by selecting a CC through a first price auction, both manufacturers’
profits are negatively impacted, a result not found when CCs form alliances with the retailer (Wang et al.,
2003). Furthermore, the retailer’s gains and the manufacturers’ losses increase as more responsibilities are
delegated.
Our analysis shows that under self-management the retailer uses the the threat of BM allocation to
force the manufacturers to lower their wholesale prices, but no BM is implemented. The delegation of BM,
however, results in BM actually being implemented by the CC, forcing the NCC to further lower its price.
Unlike BM, the retailer does implement CM but has to be judicious in doing so. Because CM increases the
consumers’ valuation of both products, the manufacturers opportunistically raise their wholesale prices and
the retailer could end up with lower profits if the costs of CM are high. When CM is delegated to a CC,
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the CC is able to use its control of the retail price of the NCC to prevent the NCC from opportunistically
its wholesale price. This helps increase category profit which is then surrendered to the retailer during the
bidding process. Nonetheless, we observe that the CC increases the use of CM. The delegation of both BM
and CM combines these effects, resulting not only in maximizing retailer profit, but also in maximizing the
use of IMA. This is consistent with the service efficiency effect found by Subramanian et al. (2010).
Because doing so eliminates double marginalization, the delegation of pricing causes an asymmetry in
the market share of the two brands, thereby leading to an increase in consumer surplus. While the use of
IMA by the retailer has no impact on consumer surplus, the delegation of both pricing and BM can lead to
reduced consumer surplus if the CC is able to force the NCC to price at zero. Finally, we find that category
profit is always reduced when a CC is used, but these losses can be mitigated by the delegation of BM as
BM is a more cost effective method than price reductions to increase market share.
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Chapter 4
Category Captainship With Both
High And Low Quality Products
4.1 Introduction
The use of category captains (CC) and the carrying of store brands are two marketing strategies which are
both growing in popularity among retailers (Subramanian et al., 2010; Kurtulus et al., 2013; Pauwels and
Srinivasan, 2004; Raju et al., 1995). Retailers are eager to experiment with both, as both are capable of
increasing retailers’ leverage in negotiations with manufacturers (Wang et al., 2003; Sayman et al., 2002). As
the implementation of both of these practices continues to spread across many types of product categories in
practice, so too does the probability that retailers will soon face decisions regarding the joint implementation
of both practices in a single category. While there has been no shortage of academic research studying the
successful implementation of both category captainship (Nijs et al., 2014; Misra et al., 2009; Gooner et al.,
2011; Morgan et al., 2007) and the introduction of store brands (Wu and Wang, 2005; Sethuraman, 2009;
Karray and Zaccour, 2006), there as of yet has not been any research into their joint implementation.
Therefore, with these issues in mind, the main objective of this chapter is to fill this gap in the academic
literature by examining the effects of a retailer implementing category captainship in a category where it
currently carries store brands.
Using a game theoretical model, we first study a category where store brands are not an option for
the retailer due to the lack of an external manufacturer capable or producing the retailer’s desired types
of store brands. Instead of store brands we examine a category where manufacturers have the option of
carrying a line extension of lower quality than their current product offering, where consumers view these low
quality products as being comparable to store brands. We follow up this model with one where an external
manufacturer is available to the retailer to produce store brands, negating the use of the manufacturers’
low quality line extensions. In this model the retailer currently carries an assortment of store brands and
manages the category itself and is interested in outsourcing both its category management responsibilities
and the production of its store brands to a CC in an effort to consolidate its supply chain. In both models,
which manufacturer is chosen as CC is determined through an auction where the manufacturers submit bids
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detailing how they would manage the category if selected as CC, and how much they are willing to pay the
retailer for the right to do so, in the form of a one time cash payment. While the idea that a manufacturer
would pay a retailer for category captainship is controversial, it is commonly found in practice (Tenser,
1996). Managing product categories at the retail level affords manufacturers many opportunities with which
to increase their profit, so the idea that they would be willing to pay for something they value is practical.
In fact, it has even been reported that manufacturers are known to approach retailers and offer to pay them
for CC designation (Merrefield, 1996).
In the absence of a CC, but in the presence of an external manufacturer, the retailer in our model is in
charge of deciding how its store brands are marketed. Ideally the retailer would like to continue deciding
how its store brands are marketed when using a CC, but that might not always be an option. The most
common marketing strategy for store brands is to model them after a national brand (Schmalensee, 1978),
specifically, store brands should be modeled after a national brand who is not the leading national brand
(Sayman et al., 2002). The reasoning behind this is that given that store brands are going to poach the
most customers from whichever national brand they are modeled after, and that the leading national brand
typically has the least price sensitive customers, why would you want to poach those customers who are
willing to pay the most with a product designed to be a less expensive alternative? You wouldn’t, which
leads to a problem for the retailer when it uses a CC: what if the manufacturer who submits the largest bid
is not willing to market the retailer’s store brands in the best interests of the retailer? What if none of the
manufacturers are? To account for this, in our analysis we look at both the scenario where manufacturers
would be willing to market the retailer’s store brands as the retailer desires and the scenario where they
would not be.
What we find is that the usefulness of category captainship for retailers who are looking to outsource
both their category management responsibilities as well as the production of their store brands depends
largely on the willingness of the manufacturers to market store brands as they are told. In our model, if the
manufacturers are willing to let the retailer decide how its store brands are to be marketed, then the retailer
is willing to use a CC; if not, then the retailer is only willing to use a national brand manufacturer as CC
for a limited number of conditions. When this occurs we explore the possibility that the retailer may ask
the external manufacturer to enter into the bidding process for category captainship.
In both the presence and the absence of an external manufacturer the retailer would prefer that either the
CC model its store brand after the non-category captain’s (NCC) brand or that the NCC alone carries a low
quality line extension, which follows closely with what the literature predicts (Sayman et al., 2002). While
this is outcome is difficult for the retailer to achieve when it manages the category itself, we find that the use
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of a CC under the right conditions will lead to a product assortment which is closer to the retailer’s desired
product assortment than the retailer is able to achieve when it manages the category itself. This outcome
is not one which is desired by the manufacturers, however, the manufacturers may be forced to implement
it as they get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma when submitting their bids for category captainship. While
assuming control of the category could be profitable for the manufacturer selected as CC, under almost all
conditions, the resulting prisoner’s dilemma faced by the manufacturers leads to both manufacturers losing
money when a CC is used. If the manufacturers have sufficient negotiation leverage as to dictate the type
of store brand they produce as CC, it is possible for the retailer to still elect to use a CC and have both
manufacturers profit from its use.
It is commonly argued that while category captainship may be harmful to members of the channel, the
channel as a whole as well as consumers should expect to benefit from category captainship. The reasoning is
that manufacturers have a better understanding of consumer preferences as they are more actively engaged in
a specific category, as opposed to retailers who typically deal with hundreds of product categories. While we
do find evidence of category captainship leading to increases in both category profit and consumer surplus,
the type of low quality product being carried determines how frequently these gains can be expected. If the
low quality products being carried are line extensions instead of store brands, consumers are much more
likely to see increases in their surplus. If instead the low quality products being carried are store brands,
when CCs are unwilling to produce store brands modeled after the NCC’s brand, under the majority of
conditions both the category and the consumers suffer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §4.2 we introduce and analyze our base model of
manufacturer competition when no external manufacturer is available to produce store brands for the retailer.
In §4.3 we extend our base model to include external manufacturers who can produce store brands for the
retailer. In §4.4 we further extend our base model to allow for the possibility that manufacturers may posses
sufficient negotiation strength as to refuse making dissimilarly marketed store brands. When this occurs we
allow the retailer to invite the external manufacturer to join the auction for category captainship. In §4.5
we conclude with a summary of our results and considerations for future research.
4.2 Base Model
Our base model consists of two national brand manufacturers, M1 and M2, a single retailer, R, and a single
product category which carries both high quality national brand products and low quality products, which
can be either low quality national brands or store brands depending on the availability of external sources
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capable of producing store brands. We assume that consumers are indifferent between low quality national
brands and store brands and as such consumers assign equal value to whichever low quality product type is
available. For the remainder of this section we assume that no external manufacturer capable of producing
store brands is available to R and that all low quality products carried in the category will be low quality
line extensions produced by M1 and M2. In the next section we assume that an external manufacturer is
available to R to produce its store brands. The category always carries two high quality national brand
products, N1 and N2, produced by manufacturers M1 and M2 respectively, and can carry up to two low
quality national brands, S1 and S2, which are also produced by manufacturers M1 and M2 respectively. M1
and M2 only carry their respective low quality products if it is profitable for them to do so. M1 and M2
produce their respective products at zero cost and sell them to R at wholesale prices wN1/wS1 and wN2/wS2 ,
which are then marked-up by R by mN1/mS1 and mN2/mS2 for N1/S1 and N2/S2 respectively.
The size of the consumer population has been normalized to one and the consumers are assumed to be
heterogeneous in their preference for the two national brands. Consumers’ brand preference heterogeneity
is modeled by placing them on a Hotelling’s line of length one, where the maximum value any consumer
can assign to the importance of either high quality national brand is z. A consumer at point x on the
brand importance line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) will assign a value of z(1 − x) to N1 and a value of zx to N2. How
consumers value low quality brands is determined by the manufacturers’ reputation for producing product
line extensions, y. A consumer at point x on the brand importance line will assign a value of zy(1 − x)
to S1 and a value of zyx to S2. To ensure that no consumer values a low quality product more than its
high quality counterpart, we restrict y to the range 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. In addition to brand importance, consumers
also derive utility from the product category (using the toothpaste category as an example, all brands of
toothpaste offer consumers utility through the removal of plaque and the feeling of a fresh, clean mouth).
All consumers, regardless of their location on the brand importance line, will receive equal category utility
from the purchase of either high quality or low quality products, a value we have normalized to one. The
utility and demand functions associated with each of the four product types can be found in Table 4.1, where
demand is calculated by locating the marginal consumers for each product.
As mentioned previously we do not assume that the manufacturers necessarily carry both their high
quality and low quality products under all conditions, we instead assume that the manufacturers only carry
their respective low quality products when it is optimal for them to do so. To determine the manufacturers’
optimal product line we solve three games: when neither manufacturer carries its low quality product, when
only one manufacturer carries its low quality product, and when both manufacturers carry their respective
low quality products. As the manufacturers are symmetric, we only need to consider the case where either M1
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Utility (High Quality) Utility (Low Quality)
uN1(x) = 1 + z(1− x)− wN1 −mN1 uS1(x) = 1 + zy(1− x)− wS1 −mS1
uN2(x) = 1 + zx− wN2 −mN2 uS2(x) = 1 + zyx− wS2 −mS2
Demand (All Products) Marginal Consumers
dN1 = xN1 uN1(xN1) = uS1(xN1)
dN2 = 1− xN2 uN2(xN2) = uS1(xN2)
dS1 = xS1 − xN1 uS1(xS1) = 0
dS2 = xN2 − xS2 uS2(xS2) = 0
Table 4.1: Utility and demand functions for each of the four product types
or M2 carries its low quality product to understand both of their preferences in the second game. Without
loss of generality, when solving the second game we assume that M1 has elected to carry both N1 and S1
while M2 has elected to caryy only N2. Using backwards induction we solve the three games as described
in Table 4.2.
No S1 or S2 Only S1 Both S1 and S2
Maximize ΠR = dN1mN1 + dN2mN2 ΠR = dN1mN1 + dN2mN2 ΠR = dN1mN1 + dN2mN2
+ dS1mS1 + dS1mS1 + dS2mS2
Subject to xN2 − xN1 ≥ 0 xN2 − xS1 ≥ 0 xS2 − xS1 ≥ 0
Where ΠM1 = dN1wN1 ΠM1 = dN1wN1 + dS1wS1 ΠM1 = dN1wN1 + dS1wS1
ΠM2 = dN2wN2 ΠM2 = dN2wN2 ΠM2 = dN2wN2 + dS2wS2
Table 4.2: Profit functions and constraints when R manages the category
Each of the three games consists of two stages. In the first stage the manufacturers set the wholesale
prices for all the products they plan on carrying. In the second stage R sets the final retail price for
each product being carried. The single constraint included is to ensure that consumer utility remains non-
negative for all consumers. This constraint also prevents any demand from going negative. The resulting
unique equilibriums for each game are shown in Figure 4.1, while the equilibrium values for these games
after solving can be found in Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3.
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Figure 4.1: Areas of unique equilibrium when R manages the category and M1 and M2 produce 0, 1 or 2
total line extensions
In all three games the manufacturers and the retailer use either a margin pricing strategy or a market-
share pricing strategy. Margin pricing strategies are used when a player would prefer to serve only those
high-value consumers who are willing to pay the most for their brands, and are typically used when z is
large. Market-share pricing strategies are used for smaller values of z when players are forced to compete
on price for consumers who weakly prefer their brands. Equilibriums in each game are characterized by the
combination of pricing strategies used. From Figure 4.1, in the areas RC0, RD1 and RC2, all three of the
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players elect to use margin strategies as z is relatively large, leaving the market uncovered. As z decreases
the players are forced to switch from margin to market-share strategies as lower values of z lead to more
intense pricing competition for the marginal consumers.
The specific values of y and z where players elect to switch from margin to market-share strategies as
z decreases are not the same for each player, leading to areas RB0, RB1, RC1 and RB2, where R elects to
use a margin strategy while at least one manufacturer continues to use a market-share strategy. In these
areas, while the market is fully covered, at least one manufacturer is still setting prices which reflect their
desire to serve only high-value consumers. In the first and third games the manufacturers are symmetric
with respect to their decision making, as in each game they both carry the same number of products. This
is why in these two games there are only three equilibrium, as both M1 and M2 elect to switch their pricing
strategies simultaneously. In the second game however, the manufacturers are not symmetric, as one of them
carries a low quality product whereas the other does not, leading to the areas RB1 and RC1. In the second




. This is because M1 is willing to keep
its prices higher for more values of y and z than M2 is because M1 is able to use S1 as a buffer to protect
N1 from having to compete on price for consumers. In these four areas the market is covered but not all of
the players are electing to use market-share pricing strategies, leading to R shouldering more of the burden
from price competition and increasing the rate at which it lowers retail prices as z decreases.
For small values of y and z
(
the areas RA0, RA1 and RA2
)
, all three players elect to use market-share
pricing strategies, fully covering the market. When the pricing strategies used by the players are aligned,
either margin/margin or market-share/market-share, the burden of price competition is more evenly shared
between the players. Figure 4.2 displays each player’s product assortment preference by number of line
extensions carried. From Figure 4.2 we can see that while the manufacturers’ preferred number of line
extensions decreases with z and is independent of the pricing strategies used, R’s preference is to avoid areas
where it uses a market-share strategy and at least one manufacturer uses a margin strategy.
Manufacturer preference is based on how many consumers they can serve with their high quality products.
For sufficiently large values of y and z when the market will not be covered with only high quality products,
the manufacturers prefer to both introduce low quality products with the aim of serving consumers who
otherwise would not make a purchase. As y and z decrease, the manufacturers are best served by only
one of them offering a low quality product. While the manufacturer who offers the low quality product
(in this case M1) is more profitable than the one who does not (M2), M2 is better off than if M1 had not
carried S1 at all, as M2 would rather have its high quality product, N2, compete with M1’s lower quality
product, S1. For sufficiently small values of y and z where N1 and N2 alone can cover the market, the
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Figure 4.2: Each player’s assortment preference
manufacturers would only harm themselves by offering consumers lower quality (and therefore lower priced)
alternatives.
While the manufacturers’ assortment preference is based on maximizing the sales of N1 and N2, the
retailer’s assortment preference is based on pricing control. For both sufficiently small (market-share/market-
share) and sufficiently large (margin/margin) values of y and z, the retailer prefers that both manufacturers
carry low quality products. While the manufacturers also prefer to carry both S1 and S2 when y and z are
large, only R prefers that they are both carried when y and z are small. When all four products are carried
for small values of y and z instead of just N1 and N2, there exist three separate pricing competitions, N1
vs. S1, S1 vs. S2 and S2 vs. N2, as opposed to just N1 vs. N2. When all four products are carried under
these conditions, M1 and M2 find themselves in the following prisoner’s dilemma: while they would both
be best served by setting the wholesale prices for all four of their products high, either manufacturer would
be better off undercutting the other’s low quality product, forcing that manufacturer to lower the wholesale
price for its low quality product in order to compete, and also lower the price for its high quality product as
its low quality product is now more attractive to high value consumers who prefer its brand. This leads to
both manufacturers being forced to lower their wholesale prices for all four products, allowing the retailer
to restore pricing balance by increasing retail prices for all four products.
The only exception to R’s preference for two line extensions is when y and z are such that it finds itself
in a market-share/margin pricing scenario. When this occurs, R prefers the carrying of one line extension
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over zero, as long as y and z are not such that there once again is a market-share/margin pricing scenario.
When each manufacturer carries a line extension but is able to use margin pricing while R uses market-share
pricing, manufacturers are no longer caught in the prisoner’s dilemma they face when they too use margin
pricing strategies, thusly eliminating what made two line extensions the most attractive product assortment
for R. The retailer prefers the carrying of a single line extension over that of zero, because it results in
two pricing competitions (N1 vs. S1 and S1 vs. N2), as opposed to one (N1 vs. N2), so long as y and z are
not such that the pricing scenario is not market-share/margin. If that is in fact the case, R prefers the
carrying of zero line extensions with margin/margin pricing. From Figure 4.2 we can see that R’s preferred
assortment as a function of y and z always has either market-share/market-share or margin/margin pricing
associated with it. These findings are summarized in Proposition 4.1
Proposition 4.1. When retailers manage product categories themselves and product line decisions are left
up to manufacturers, the equilibrium number of line extensions will decrease with brand importance as man-
ufacturers attempt to avoid competition as brands become less important to consumers. These product as-
sortments differ from those preferred by retailers which are product assortments that maximize manufacturer
competition.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
4.2.1 Category Captainship
Category captainship in our model is awarded through an auction where each manufacturer submits a bid
describing how they would manage the category if selected as CC and what profit R can expect to earn from
the execution of their management plan. The expected earnings of R are broken into two parts within the
bid: how much R earns from the sales of each brand as a function of mN1 , mN2 , mS1 and mS2 , and how
much the manufacturer submitting the bid is willing to pay R for the right to be CC. The bidding process for
category captainship functions as a second price auction where the manufacturer who is able to offer R the
greatest expected profit as CC need only bid ε (ε→ 0) more than the most the other manufacturer is able
to offer R in order to submit the winning bid and secure the role of CC. However, since the manufacturers
in our model are symmetric with respect to their ability to manage the category, they each are able to offer
R the same maximum amount, resulting in the manufacturers submitting matching bids. Since the bids R
receives are identical, R ends up appointing either M1 or M2 as CC at random. To determine which product
assortment the manufacturers will carry, we solve the following four games, where without loss of generality
we assume that M1 is acting as the CC: (0) there are no line extensions, (1) there is only the single line
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extension S1, (2) there is only the single line extension S2, and (3) there are two line extensions, both S1
and S2. All four games have the same utility and demand functions as described in Tables 4.1.
As the goal of each manufacturer is to secure category captainship, their primary concern is how much
money they can generate for R, not themselves. If the manufacturers approached this problem from the
perspective of maximizing solely their own profit, the other manufacturer would be able to offer R a more
lucrative bid by considering R’s profit in addition to its own. To solve its games, M1 does not need to consider
either mN1 or mS1 as these values can be adjusted during the calculation of its bid, and we therefore are
able to set these values to zero. This leaves M1 with objective functions of Π
0
M1
= dN1wN1 + dN2mN2 ,
Π1M1 = dN1wN1 + dN2mN2 + dS1wS1 , Π
2
M1
= dN1wN1 + dN2mN2 + dS2mS2 , and Π
3
M1
= dN1wN1 + dN2mN2 +
dS1wS1 + dS2mS2 . Finally, in each game, M1 needs to constrain each problem to ensure that no consumer
purchasing a product receives negative utility, and does so by including the constraints xN2 − xN1 ≥ 0,
xN2 − xS1 ≥ 0, xS2 − xN1 ≥ 0, and xS2 − xS1 ≥ 0 for games (0), (1), (2) and (3) respectively. These
constraints also prevent any demand from going negative.
In this formulation there is no profit function for R as M1’s profit function includes all variables not
controlled by M2. The retailer’s profit is therefore equal to the winning bid. If we represent the non-
category captains’s (NCC) profit by ΠM2 = dN2wN2 + dS2wS2 , the bid each manufacturer is willing to make




, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, }. This leaves M1 with
profit equal to ΠM2 , as it bids away everything else it earns. While this is less than ideal for M1 as it is
forced to design and execute a category management plan that results in it earning the same amount as
the manufacturer who did neither of these things, M1 is forced to do this as it gets caught in a prisoner’s
dilemma where it has no choice but to bid this amount, as submitting any lesser amount could allow M2
to outbid them and win category captainship outright. The unique equilibriums found after solving each of
these four games are shown in Figure 4.3 and the final equilibrium assortment that the category will carry
is shown in Figure 4.4.
From Figure 4.4 we see that the use of a CC results in optimal product assortments which closely
resemble the retailers preferred assortments, assortments that it is largely unable to attain when it manages
the category itself. Similar to R’s preferred product assortment, for the majority of y and z both S1 and
S2 are carried. The exception to this is the region common to the areas M
B1 and MB3. These areas are
defined by M1 electing to use a market-share pricing strategy while M2 elects to use a margin strategy.
As when R managed the category, areas where the players elect to use differing pricing strategies are sub-
optimal for generating retailer profit as the balance of pricing power shifts from the player who moves last
(M1 in this case) to the player who moves first (M2). In these areas, maximum manufacturer bids are found
52
Figure 4.3: Areas of unique equlibrium when M1 manages the category as CC
in the area MC2 where the CC and the NCC both choose to use margin pricing strategies. Somewhat
counterintuitively, when a single low quality product is carried it is the NCC’s and not the CC’s. However,
any gains afforded to M2 when this occurs are offset by the manufacturers using the same type of pricing
strategy. From the perspective of maximizing retailer profit, it is always preferred to avoid scenarios where
any manufacturer has even a small amount of pricing power. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.2
Proposition 4.2. When category captainship is awarded through an auction to the highest bidding manu-
facturer, under most conditions the product category will carry two low quality brands. The only exception is
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium assortments when M1 manages the category as CC
when doing so would result in dissimilar pricing strategies. When this occurs, the single low quality product
that is carried will be that of the non-category captain. Under all conditions, the retailer will profit from the
use of a category captain and both manufacturers will experience decreased profits as they get caught in a
prisoner’s dilemma when submitting their bids.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
4.2.2 Category Profit and Consumer Surplus
Knowing how M1 manages the category as CC, we can now examine the effects that this has on both the
profit of the category as a whole (ΠCAT ) and the total consumer surplus (Υ). One of the selling points of
category captainship is that CCs should be able to leverage both their knowledge of the product category as
well as the pricing advantage afforded to them through the elimination of double marginalization to increase
category profit. Likewise, consumers can benefit from category captainship as CCs are able to increase their
market share for both new and existing consumers. New consumers benefit from receiving non-zero utility
from the purchase of an item (as opposed to the zero utility they received before when they did not make
a purchase) and existing consumers benefit from switching to the CCs brand from the NCCs brand, as
switching brands typically occurs when consumers receive a better price from the brand they are switching
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to. The changes in both category profit and consumer surplus which result from the use of a CC can be
seen in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Changes in ΠCAT and Υ when M1 or M2 is selected as CC
From Figure 4.5 we see that while the use of a CC as expected has a positive impact on consumer surplus,
for sufficiently small values of z it leads to a reduction of category profit. The main driver of both of these
findings is the increase in the size of the product assortment offered when a CC is used. With respect to
consumer surplus this is a counterintuitive finding, as it is widely believed that consumer surplus increases
with increases in consumer choice. When R managed the category and consumers only had two product
options for small values of z (N1 and N2), consumers actually benefited from the limited selection as R was
forced to price each product to appeal to half of the market. When M1 manages the category and consumers
now have four product options, M1 is able to price the high quality products specifically with high-value
consumers in mind, and price the low quality products as to be more appealing to low value consumers. This
is operationalized by M1 raising the retail prices for N1 and N2. When it does this, high value consumers
still purchase high quality products, but now do so at a higher price, reducing their individual surplus.
Simultaneously, low value consumers now find the high quality products to be too expensive, and instead
purchase low quality products, which reduces their surplus as low quality products offer them less utility. As
both high and low value consumers receive less utility, the total consumer surplus for the market decreases.
With respect to category profit, we find that the use of a CC is able to increase category profit as the CC
is able to serve additional consumers through the elimination of double marginalization for sufficiently large
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values of z. For areas where R is able to cover the market when it manages the category itself, under certain
conditions the use of a CC is still able to increase category profit as doing so leads to the carrying of two
low quality brands instead of just one. Carrying more products allows the CC to better target high value
consumers by giving low value consumers an additional purchase option. However, for sufficiently small
values of z where the market is covered when managed by R, the use of a CC leads to decreased category
profit. This occurs because the carrying of additional low quality products decreases the sales of high quality
products, products which can command a premium price as they offer consumers greater utility. This effect
is so strong for very small values of z, that the use of a CC can lead to decreases in both category profit and
consumer surplus. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3. When category captainship is awarded through an auction to the highest bidding manu-
facturer, under almost all conditions consumer surplus increases as the CC is able to take advantage of the
absence of double marginalization to both serve new consumers and offer existing consumers lower prices.
The only exception is for very small values of z where the use of a CC results in two low quality products
being carried instead of zero. When this occurs, consumers suffer as the CC is better able to segment the
market, resulting in high value consumers paying more for high quality products and low value consumers
receiving diminished utility through the purchase of low quality products. While serving additional consumers
increases category profit, the introduction of two low quality products for sufficiently small values of z de-
creases category profit as consumers pay less when they switch from high to low quality products.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
4.3 External Manufacturer Availability and Store Brands
In this section we now assume that an external manufacturer, ME , is available to produce store brands, S1
and S2 for R, where S1 and S2 have packaging which are modeled after N1 and N2 respectively. When R
elects to use ME to produce store brands instead of relying on the national brand manufacturers to produce
low quality line extensions, the product assortment decision is now made by R instead of M1 and M2.
Lemma 4.1. When electing to use ME to produce store brands, R will always elect to carry at least one
store brand.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
The reasoning behind Lemma 4.1 is that R always benefits from the additional competition induced by
the presence of a third manufacturer. Therefore, we can simplify R’s product assortment decision to whether
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to carry only a single store brand or carry both S1 and S2. Since M1 and M2 are symmetric with respect to
how consumers view their brands, R is indifferent between carrying either S1 or S2 when it elects to carry
only a single store brand. Without loss of generality, for the remainder of this section we assume that R
elects to carry S1 when it carries only a single store brand. To determine its optimal store brand assortment,









Maximize ΠR = dN1mN1 + dN2mN2 + dS1mS1 ΠR = dN1mN1 + dN2mN2 + dS1mS1 + dS2mS2
Subject to xN2 − xS1 ≥ 0 xS2 − xS1 ≥ 0
ΠM1 = dN1wN1 ΠM1 = dN1wN1
Where ΠM2 = dN2wN2 ΠM2 = dN2wN2
ΠME = dS1wS1 ΠME = dS1wS1 + dS2wS2
Table 4.3: Profit functions and constraints when R manages the category and carries store brands
In the first stage of each game, M1, M2 and the external manufacturer, ME , set wholesale prices wN1 ,









respectively. The single constraint included is to ensure that consumer utility remains non-
negative for all consumers. This constraint also prevents any demand from going negative. The equilibrium









shows the areas where unique equilibrium exist for both games.
From Figure 4.6 we can observe that when R only carries a single store brand there exist five unique
equilibrium, and when it carries both S1 and S2 there are only two. This occurs because even though M1
and M2 are symmetric with respect to how consumers view their respective brands, when there exists a
single store brand marketed after one of the manufacturers’ national brands, the manufacturers cease to
make symmetric decisions. In the region RE1 all three manufacturers elect to set high wholesale prices
which results in the market being uncovered. As y and z decrease and the game transitions to region RD1,
while the manufacturers elect to continue setting high wholesale prices, R decides to lower its margins and
cover the market. As y and z continue to decrease, when y is sufficiently large and the game is in region
RC1, both M1 and ME elect to continue pricing high as the large y leads to consumers valuing S1 close to
how they value N1. M1 and ME are both happy to keep their respective wholesale prices high in this region,
as doing so reduces the competition each of their products faces from the other’s as the two products have
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similar branding and therefore attract similar consumers. Seeing an opportunity to serve some low value
consumers who find S1 to be too expensive, M2 lowers its wholesale price. For smaller values of y which
result in the game being in region RB1, M1 and ME both are forced to lower their respective wholesale
prices and compete for consumers who prefer N1 over N2, as S1 is now less valuable than in region R
C1. M2
is better served keeping its price high and avoiding competition with S1 as z is still relatively large. Once y
and z both become sufficiently small, all three manufacturers are forced to lower their wholesale prices and
compete fully with one another.
When R carries both S1 and S2 there are only two unique equilibrium: when the manufacturers elect









. The additional market coverage occurs because now both national brand manufacturers
are forced to compete with a store brand which targets the same consumers as their national brands. Before,
there existed an opportunity for M2 to price high while both M1 and ME were pricing low, an opportunity
which no longer exists as any attempt to keeps its price high while both M1 and ME are pricing low will be
counterproductive as N2 will lose market share to S2. This increase in manufacturer competition is beneficial
to R, and as such electing to carry two store brands as opposed to one is almost always optimal for it, which
can be seen in Figure 4.7.
From Figure 4.7 we can observe that the only exception to R carrying two store brands is when y is
sufficiently small while z is sufficiently large. Under these conditions, R’s weak reputation with respect to
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Figure 4.7: Areas where it is optimal for R to carry either one or two store brands
store brands, coupled with consumers assigning greater importance to the importance of brands, does not
induce sufficient competition among the manufacturers as both M1 and M2 elect to keep their respective
wholesale prices high as S1 and S2 will only be able to steal a minimal amount of consumers from them.
When this occurs, the majority of competition faced by S1 and S2 is from each other as ME does not have
an incentive to lower wS1 and wS2 as doing so would lead to it competing with itself. However, when there
is only one store brand, M1 and M2 can no longer rely on ME to keep its wholesale price high, as its only
product (S1) competes directly with both N1 and N2. When ME produces two store brands, they can act
as a buffer to competing with the national brands, allowing all three manufacturers to keep their respective
wholesale prices high at the expense of R. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. When R procures its store brands from ME, under most conditions it will elect to carry
two store brands as doing so increases the competition amongst all manufacturers and leads to lower wholesale
prices. The only exception is when y is sufficiently small and z is sufficiently large. Under these conditions,
M1 and M2 may elect to keep their wholesale prices high as they face minimal competition from the store
brands due to the small y and large z. When this occurs ME will also elect to keep its wholesale prices high,
reducing the margins and overall profit for R.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
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4.3.1 Category Captainship
Let us now assume that the retailer is looking to consolidate its suppliers by offering category captainship
to one of the national brand manufacturers. When pursuing this strategy R must first decide which re-
sponsibilities to delegate. It has two options: delegate control of both retail price setting and all relevant
store brand decisions (how many store brands to carry and if only one, which national brand should it be
modeled after) or delegate only control of retail pricing while retaining control over store brand decisions.
To determine which delegation strategy R should use, we solve three games all through backwards induction,
where without loss of generality we assume that M1 is the CC: (1) M1 produces the single store brand S1(
game S1
)




, and (3) M1 produces two store brands,




. All three games have the same utility and demand functions as described in
Table 4.1 and category captainship is awarded through the same bidding process as described when no ex-
ternal manufacturer was available to R. Solving these three games we find that the maximum bids from the










However, while two different games combine to form this equilibrium, in execution there is only a single
outcome as S1 is never sold during S
3. This occurs because M1 as the owner of N1 does not want to provide
consumers who prefer N1 over N2 an alternative product of similar branding if they find N1 to be too
expensive. For all values of y and z, M1 will set mS1 = 1 +
zy
2 while simultaneously setting wN1 = 1 +
z
2 and
wS2 = 1 +
zy
2 . As mN1 and mS2 are set to zero when M1 is CC and supplies R with S2, S1 faces a margin
equal in value to what M1 sets the final price for S2 at. By setting prices in this way, M1 is preventing any
consumer located on M2’s half of the brand importance line
(
1
2 < x < 1
)
from ever receiving more utility
from S1 than S2, as S1 will never be priced lower than S2 and all consumers located at any point greater
than x = 12 prefer S2 over S1, even when they are priced the same. M1 has also guaranteed that no consumer
located at any point x < 12 will purchase any product other than N1, as M1 prices N1 so that it will serve
the marginal consumer located at x = 12 . As S1 resides directly between N1 and S2 on the consumers’ brand
importance line, all consumers considering the purchase S1 will be receive more utility from the purchase of
either N1 or S2 and therefore no consumer will ever purchase S1. While R can achieve its desired outcome
of M1 producing only S2 by delegating only control of retail pricing and requesting that M1 produce either
both S1 and S2 or only S2, R can also achieve this outcome by delegating to M1 full control of the category,
including all decisions regarding store brands.
While R’s preference is for M1 to carry only S2 when M1 elects to carry only one store brand, the
preferred scenario for the manufacturers is that M1 carry only S1 as this minimizes the manufacturers’
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bids and therefore maximizes their profit. When M1 produces S1, M1 faces the competition from the store
brand head-on, as the marginal consumer located at xN1 is indifferent between N1 and S1, two products with
similar branding. While this reduces the profit for the CC as its two product offerings are competing directly
with one another, it also increases the profit for the NCC, and in our auction setting is actually better for
both manufacturers as it reduces the amount of the bid needed for winning the auction. Unfortunately for
the manufacturers however, this is not an equilibrium outcome as any manufacturer who submitted a bid
proposing to carry only a store brand modeled after its own national brand could be outbid by the other
manufacturer proposing to carry a store brand modeled after its competitor’s national brand. These results
are summarized in Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5. If the production of a retailer’s store brand is tied to category captainship awarded through
an auction process, the winning manufacturer will produce a single store brand which is modeled after its
competitor’s brand, even though both manufacturers as CC would prefer to model the store brand after their
own national brand. When this occurs, the retailer will be strictly better off using a category captain, while
both manufacturers will be strictly worse off. The retailer is able to achieve this outcome by delegating to
the CC full control of all category decisions.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
4.3.2 Category Profit and Consumer Surplus
Somewhat counterintuitively, we find that consumer surplus increases for all values of y and z, even though
the CC elects to carry one fewer product under most conditions. This occurs because R elected to carry
two store brands for the majority of y and z, which lead to decreased manufacturer competition and higher
prices. When M1 manages the category as CC, the use of only a single store brand increases the competition
between itself and M2, leading to lower prices and greater consumer surplus. M1 also elects to cover the
market for all values of y and z, where without a CC there are cases where the higher prices from the
manufacturers results in some consumers electing not to make a purchase.
While the subtraction of a store brand is a win for the consumers, category profit takes a hit as the use
of a CC decreases ΠCAT under most conditions. This can be seen in Figure 4.8. From Figure 4.8 we observe
that M1 is only able to increase ΠCAT when y is sufficiently small and z is sufficiently large. Recall that
when R managed the category itself, the combination of small y and large z values resulted in R electing to
carry only a single store brand. While M1 also elects to carry just a single store brand for these values, they
are able to do so while also completely covering the market, something that R was unable to accomplish as
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Figure 4.8: Changes in ΠCAT when R elects to use a CC
it suffered from double marginalization. By increasing the total number of consumers served in these areas,
M1 is able to increase ΠCAT while simultaneously increasing Υ.
The resulting loss of category profit can be attributed to M1 electing to carry only a single store brand.
Imagine a market where every consumer was able to purchase a different product. R would price each of
these products as to extract the full surplus from each consumer. The removal of single product would result
in two consumers purchasing the same product, but only one of these consumers would have its full surplus
extracted while the other would receive positive utility. This is what occurs when S2 is removed from the
market. Consumers who would purchase S2 if it were available must now purchase either S1 or N1. As S1
and N1 now serve more consumers, their respective retail prices must reflect the broader range of consumers
which they now serve, leading to prices which extract less surplus from all consumers who purchase either
product. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.6. The retailer’s decision to use a CC results in increased consumer surplus as the CC is
able to both serve new consumers and serve existing consumers at a lower price through the elimination of
double marginalization. This comes at a cost however, as under most conditions the CC elects to carry one
less store brand, resulting in the prices of the remaining products being adjusted downwards to account for
consumers who had previously purchased the other store brand. This downward adjustment in prices leads
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to decreased category profit when y and z are not sufficiently small and large respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
4.4 Manufacturer Willingness To Produce Certain Store Brands
Thus far our analysis has ignored the impact of all market externalities, including both the negotiating
strength of the manufacturers as well as possible negative consequences which may arise from a manufacturer
producing and marketing a store brand which resembles a competing product. If consumers assume that
retailers model their store brands after the most popular or “best” national brands, consumers over time may
come to increase their valuation of the national brand which the store brand is modeled after. Manufacturers
therefore may simply be unwilling as CCs to supply R with a store brand which is modeled after their
competitor’s brand. If this occurs, R must decide between using a CC who is only willing to produce a store
brand modeled after its own brand or forgo using a CC altogether, as R’s preferred choice is for the CC to
supply it with a store brand which is modeled after the NCC’s brand. Figure 4.9 displays the areas where
R would be willing to use a CC under these conditions.
Figure 4.9: Player profits when M1 as CC only carries S1





as it is unprofitable for them to do so otherwise. Under these conditions, category captainship becomes
unprofitable for R for sufficiently large values of y as the manufacturers reduce their bids when M1 as CC
is able to carry only S1 as opposed to carrying only S2. From Figure 4.9 we can also see that for sufficiently




that the manufacturers are now both able to profit from the use of a CC. The
resulting decrease in the manufacturers’ bids and increase in their profit is driven by the NCC no longer
having to compete with a store brand modeled after its own brand. When M1 carries only S2, the NCC
faces direct competition for consumers who prefer N2 over N1, forcing the NCC to lower its wholesale price
or risk losing consumers who feel that N2 is too expensive. Instead when M1 carries only S1, not only does
the NCC not have to compete with the store brand, but neither does the CC as it controls the retail prices
for both N1 and S1. This results in the prospect of becoming the NCC being less financially detrimental
for the manufacturers, reducing their willingness to pay for category captainship. This is operationalized
through lower bids which leads to reduced retailer profit. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.7.
Proposition 4.7. When manufacturers are unwilling as CCs to carry a store brand modeled after their
competitor, the practice of category captainship is only utilized by the retailer for select small and large
values of y and z respectively. When conditions are such that R is willing to use a CC, there does exist the
possibility that both manufacturers will be able to profit from category captainship.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
4.4.1 Inviting ME To The Category Captain Auction
In response to manufacturers being unwilling to produce opposite branded store brands as CCs, the retailer
may be best served by also allowing the external manufacturer to enter the bidding process for CC. Doing
this would provide R with two benefits. First, it potentially gives R options when the use of a CC is
unprofitable with a national brand manufacturer if ME is able to produce a bid which increases R’s profit
above what it earns when it manages the category itself. And second, the increased competition for CC has
the potential to force M1 and M2 to increase their bids or risk having ME being selected as CC. Lemma 4.2
summarizes the effects of allowing ME to also compete for category captainship.
Lemma 4.2. When ME is allowed to compete for category captainship
(i) When M1 and M2 are unwilling to carry store brands modeled after their competitors, ME will always
elect to submit a bid stating that it will carry both S1 and S2.
(ii) When M1 and M2 are willing to carry store brands modeled after their competitors, ME will never be
selected as CC.
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(iii) When M1 and M2 are unwilling to carry store brands modeled after their competitors, M1 and M2
always earn less when ME manages the category than when either of them does.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
From Lemma 4.2 we learn that the inclusion of ME in the bidding process leads to both national brand
manufacturers increasing their bids for CC as the prospect of being NCC is now less profitable. The intuition
behind the third part of Lemma 4.2 is that as CC ME does not have the same incentive to keep its prices
high as a national brand manufacturer would, leading to both M1 and M2 being forced to lower their prices
in order to stay competitive. When M1 and M2 lower their bids as a result of ME ’s inclusion in the bidding
process, R is always able to select a CC who will increase its profit, and does so as shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Areas where M1 and ME are selected as CC when M1 refuses to supply S1
From Figure 4.10 we see that the national brand manufacturers’ refusal to carry store brands which
resemble their competitors’ brand results in them being selected as CC only for select small values of y(
y ≤ 111
)
. The manufacturers’ reluctance to produce dissimilar store brands not only has negative conse-
quences for their own profit, but also negatively impacts both the category profit as well as consumer surplus,
as shown in Figure 4.11. This is a surprising result as it seems difficult to decrease both category profit
and consumer surplus simultaneously, as a decrease in one typically results in an increase in the other. In
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Figure 4.11: Changes in ΠCAT and Υ when M1 and ME are selected as CC when M1 refuses to supply S1
this scenario, the use of ME as CC is responsible for both of these findings. As ME derives the majority of
its profit from the sale of the store brands, it has an incentive to sell these products to as many consumers
as possible. By enticing consumers who would normally purchase a national brand to switch to a store
brand, these consumers are now paying less as the store brands are not as valuable to them, leading to a
reduction in category profit but a potential increase in consumer surplus. This potential gain in consumer
surplus is negated by M1 and M2 raising their respective wholesale prices as they both now serve only those
consumers who strongly prefer national brands. While the increase in prices for consumers purchasing N1
and N2 is sufficient as to prohibit consumers from benefiting, it is not sufficient as to bring the category back
to profitability as too few consumers are left purchasing national brands. These results are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. When M1 and M2 are unwilling as CCs to carry S1 and S2, respectively, and R is willing
to let ME compete for CC, ME will be selected as CC for all values of y ≥ 111 . When this occurs, while
R will profit from the use of a CC, both M1 and M2, as well as the category and consumer surplus will be
negatively impacted.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
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4.5 Summary and Discussion
The individual use of a CC or the introduction of store brands can both be profitable exercises for retailers.
However, their joint use can become complicated if the retailer is willing to delegate control of all of its
category management responsibilities except the decision regarding how its store brand should be marketed.
The retailer is best served when its store brand is marketed after the lesser of the two national brands in
the category. The CC wants to produce a store brand which is modeled after its own brand so that it can
segment and better serve its customers. When a manufacturer becomes the CC and is able to price its
product vertically, the resulting increases in its market share and revenue relegate the NCC to the role of
the “lesser” brand, the very brand that the retailer wants its store brand to resemble.
These conflicting interests are resolved by whomever has the most power. When the retailer gets to
decide how its store brand is marketed, it will always have the CC model its store brand after the NCC’s
brand; when the manufacturers gets to decide how the retailer’s store brand is marketed, they will always
model it after their own brands. Therefore, the profitability of category captainship is determined by who
gets to select the branding for the store brand: if the retailer gets to choose, it always earns more with a
CC and the manufacturers always earn less; if the manufacturers get to decide, there exist conditions where
both manufacturers can profit from the use of a CC.
The retailer’s desire for low quality products to be similar in branding to the NCC’s brand is present
even when store brands are not. When there is no external manufacturer capable of producing store brands
for the retailer, the retailer prefers that the category carry either both low quality products or only the
NCC’s. While the retailer’s desired product assortment is only implemented under certain conditions when
it manages the category itself, by using a CC a product assortment much closer to what the retailer prefers
is implemented by the manufacturers.
While consumers mostly benefit from the use of a CC when the category carries line extensions instead
of store brands, we find that consumers are almost always harmed when the retailer elects to use a CC when
the category carries store brands and the manufacturers are able to decide how the store brand is marketed.
This occurs because under most conditions the retailer will elect to have the external manufacturer serve as
the CC, resulting in the national brand manufacturers raising the wholesale prices for the national brands.
This results in fewer consumers purchasing the national brands, instead choosing to purchase store brands
which offer them less utility as they are of lower quality.
Future research into the joint usage of category captains and store brands should delve further into the
power struggle between retailers and manufacturers regarding who markets which store brand how. While
we find conditions where the external manufacturer is selected as the CC, national brand manufacturers have
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greater potential to generate additional revenue through the elimination of double marginalized pricing with
respect to their national brands, leading to more consumers purchasing national brands which can be priced
at a premium. Developing new mechanisms for category captain selection which lead to national brand
manufacturers being selected as CCs, even when they will only carry similarly branded store products, could




In this dissertation we created three models of category captainship under what are assumed to be some
of the harshest conditions manufacturers can expect to encounter — the delegation of retail price setting
and the awarding of category captainship through an auction. In our first model (Chapter 2) we created
manufacturer asymmetry to gain a better understanding of the role manufacturer size plays when category
captainship is awarded through an auction. As expected we uncovered conditions where category captainship
can lead to a decrease in profits for all manufacturers, the CC included. But we also highlighted conditions
where not only can the manufacturer assuming the role of CC profit, but the “losing” manufacturer who is
relegated to the role of NCC can also profit. In an auction setting such as the one we designed, the ability of
a manufacturer to profit from category captainship is a function of both how much they value being CC as
well as how much their rival values the same role. One manufacturer alone benefiting greatly from control of
the category is not sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure that the retailer is able to earn more by relinquishing
its control of the category. Both manufacturers need to be able to experience substantial gains from the role
of CC in order for the auction to serve its intended purpose of forcing the manufacturers into submitting
large bids which then can lead to the process being a worthwhile endeavor for the retailer.
In our second essay (Chapter 3) we allowed the retailer to delegate category management responsibilities
in addition to the setting of retail prices, specifically the design and execution of in-store marketing activities
(IMA). We founf that IMA are powerful category management tools which a retailer can use to either grow
the category (CM) or affect market share (BM). However, the retailer can more successfully exploit IMA
by delegating their use to a CC. We show that while retailers and consumers are able to benefit from the
delegation of pricing and IMA, manufacturers, including the CC, and the category suffer. When IMA are
delegated along with retail pricing, manufacturers get caught in a prisoner’s dilemma — paying for more
IMA but not profiting from it. The fear of losing category captainship to its rivals causes each manufacturer
to bid much more than any extra profit that could be gained from the CC designation. For this reason the
retailer always benefits from the use of a CC, even without using a reservation price during the auction,
while both the CC and the NCC are adversely affected. Thus by selecting a CC through a first price auction,
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both manufacturers’ profits are negatively impacted, a result not found when CCs form alliances with the
retailer (Wang et al., 2003). Furthermore, the retailer’s gains and the manufacturers’ losses increase as more
responsibilities are delegated.
In our final essay (Chapter 4) we considered a model where both high quality and low quality products
were carried in the category. We found that the retailer is best served when its store brand is marketed
after the lesser of the two national brands in the category. The CC wants to produce a store brand which
is modeled after its own brand so that it can segment and better serve its customers. When a manufacturer
becomes the CC and is able to price its product vertically, the resulting increases in its market share and
revenue relegate the NCC to the role of the “lesser” brand, the very brand that the retailer wants its
store brand to resemble. The retailer’s desire for low quality products to be similar in branding to the
NCC’s brand is present even when store brands are not. When there is no external manufacturer capable of
producing store brands for the retailer, the retailer prefers that the category carry either both low quality
products or only the NCC’s. While the retailer’s desired product assortment is only implemented under
certain conditions when it manages the category itself, by using a CC a product assortment much closer to
what the retailer prefers is implemented by the manufacturers.
Future category captain related research should study the effects that other forms of manufacturer
asymmetry have on the profitability of the manufacturers and the retailer. It is in the best fiscal interest of
the retailer to structure the role of the CC in such a way that manufacturers are able to generate significant
increases after assuming control of managing the category. Category captain related research should also
study what is the best combination of responsibilities to delegate to specific types of manufacturers. It is
possible that some manufacturers may not see much of a change in how they value category captainship
when responsibility “A” is delegated, but may see a very large change when instead responsibility “B” is.
Additionally, future research into the joint usage of category captains and store brands should delve
further into the power struggle between retailers and manufacturers regarding who markets which store
brand how. While we find conditions where the external manufacturer is selected as the CC, national
brand manufacturers have more potential to generate additional revenue through the elimination of double
marginalized pricing with respect to their national brands, leading to more consumers purchasing national
brands which can be priced at a premium. Developing new mechanisms for category captain selection which
lead to national brand manufacturers being selected as CCs even when they will only carry similarly branded
store products could lead to more optimal implementations of category captainship.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
A.1 Brand Importance Is Relatively Strong
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
To prove Proposition 2.1 we first solve for the market equilibrium when R, M1 and M2 each individually
manage the category itself (Tables A.1 and A.2). We then solve for each manufacturers’ Γ, and by taking
Γ1−Γ2 are able to determine which manufacturer will be selected as CC (Table A.3) for each value of q and
z.
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Table A.1: Equilibrium values when R, M1 and M2 manage the category (z > 1)
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Table A.2: Equilibrium profits when R, M1 and M2 manage the category (z > 1)
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Area Γ1 = Π
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8 z − (z+1)
2
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Area The Sign of Γ1 − Γ2 (Who is selected as CC)
MA1 ∩MA2 Positive when q > 0 and z > 0 (M1 is CC)
MA1 ∩MB2 Positive when q < 4−2z3z (M1 is CC)
MB1 ∩MB2 Always zero (either M1 or M2 randomly selected as CC)
MB1 ∩MC2 Positive when q > 3−z3z (M1 is CC)
MC1 ∩MC2 Positive when q > 0 (M1 is CC)
MB1 ∩MD2 Positive when q < z+32z (M1 is CC)
MC1 ∩MD2 Positive when q < z+12z (M1 is CC), negative when q > z+12z (M2 is CC)
MD1 ∩ME2 Always negative (M2 is CC)
Table A.3: The value each manufacturer assigns to category captainship (z > 1)
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
To solve Proposition 2.2 we evaluate the changes in the players profit by subtracting what they earned in
equilibrium without a CC from what they earn with a CC. For R, this calculation is Γ2−ΠRR when M1 is CC







) − ΠRM2 for when M1 and M2 are the CC respectively (Table A.5). Finally, for the NCC
the relevant calculations are Π1M2 − ΠRM2 and Π2M1 − ΠRM1 for when M1 and M2 are the NCC respectively
(Table A.6).
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Area (M1 is CC) Γ2 −ΠRR N.C.(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RA 28 q+2432 − (27 q2+32 q+8) z32 − 18 z > 0 q < 2 32 √5 z2+25 z+11−16 z+1427 z(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RA (7 q2+5 q+1) z8 + 38 z − 9 q+28 > 0 q > 0, z > 0(
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MC1 ∩MC2
) ∩ RA (z+1)216 z > 0 z > 0(
MB1 ∩MD2
) ∩ RB (8 q2+8 q+3) z16 + 1916 z − 24 q+1016 > 0 q > 0, z > 0(
MC1 ∩MD2
) ∩ RB (z+1)216 z > 0 z > 0
Area (M2 is CC) Γ1 −ΠRR N.C.(
MC1 ∩MD2
) ∩ RB (q z−z−1)24 z > 0 z > 0(
MD1 ∩ME2
) ∩ RC 0 n.a.
Table A.4: Retailer gains (z > 1)
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Table A.5: CC gains (z > 1)
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2
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MD2 ∩ RB 0 n.a.
ME2 ∩ RC 0 n.a.
Table A.6: NCC gains (z > 1)
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A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2.3 has two parts. To prove the first part we show where category profit (ΠCAT ) increases when
a CC is used where the superscripts 1, 2, and R represent the category being managed by M1, M2, and R
respectively (Table A.7) and ΠCAT = ΠM1 + ΠM2 + ΠR. To prove the second part we show where total
consumer surplus (Υ) increases when a CC is used (Tables A.8 and A.9) where Υ is found by integrating
the consumer utility functions for each product from the left most marginal consumer to the right most on
the brand preference line.
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Table A.7: Category gains (z > 1)
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Table A.8: Consumer surplus by area (z > 1)
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2
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Table A.9: Consumer surplus gains (z > 1)
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A.2 Brand Importance Is Relatively Weak
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.4
To prove Proposition 2.4 we first solve for the market equilibrium when R, M1 and M2 each individually
manage the category itself (Tables A.10 and A.11). We then solve for each manufacturers’ Γ, and by taking
Γ1 − Γ2 are able to determine which manufacturer will be selected as CC (Table A.12) for each value of q
and z.
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Table A.10: Equilibrium values when R, M1 and M2 manage the category (z < 1)
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Table A.11: Equilibrium profits when R, M1 and M2 manage the category (z < 1)
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Area Γ1 = Π
1
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32 − (q−6) z16
MB1 ∩MD2 (q+1) z2 + 12 z − q2 q z + 1z − q q (1−z)2 − 1−z2 − 1−z2 z
Area The Sign of Γ1 − Γ2 (Who is selected as CC)
MA1 ∩MA2 Always positive (M1 is CC)
MA1 ∩MB2 Positive when q < 23 (M1 is CC), negative when q > 23 (M2 is CC)
MA1 ∩MC2 Positive when q < 23 (M1 is CC), negative when q > 23 (M2 is CC)
MA1 ∩MD2 Negative when q > 23 (M2 is CC as q ≥ 23 throughout this entire area)
MB1 ∩MD2 Negative when q < z+1z (M2 is CC as q ≤ 1)
Table A.12: The value each manufacturer assigns to category captainship (z < 1)
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.5
To solve Proposition 2.5 we evaluate the changes in the players profit by subtracting what they earned in
equilibrium without a CC from what they earn with a CC. For R, this calculation is Γ2−ΠRR when M1 is CC







)−ΠRM2 for when M1 and M2 are the CC respectively (Table A.14). Finally, for the NCC
the relevant calculations are Π1M2 − ΠRM2 and Π2M1 − ΠRM1 for when M1 and M2 are the NCC respectively
(Table A.15).
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Area (M1 is CC) Γ2 −ΠRR N.C.(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RA 347 q2 z288 + 21 q z8 + 11 z8 > 0 q > 0, z > 0(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RB − (21 q2+30 q+10) z16 + q + 1 > 0 z < 16 q21 q2+30 q+10 + 1621 q2+30 q+10(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RC − (27 q2+32 q+8) z32 − 18 z − −28 q−2432 > 0 q < 2 32 √5 z2+25 z+1127 z + 1427 z − 1627(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RA 61 q2 z144 + 13 q z4 + 5 z4 > 0 q > 0, z > 0(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RB − (67 q2+40 q+24) z32 + q + 1 > 0 z < 32 q67 q2+40 q+24 + 3267 q2+40 q+24(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RC − (13 q2+3 q+3) z8 − 18 z − −7 q−68 > 0 q < √3√−49 z2+90 z−126 z + 726 z − 326(
MA1 ∩MC2
) ∩ RC (7 q2+5 q−3) z8 − 18 z + 6−9 q8 > 0 q > √109 z2−258 z+10914 z + 914 z − 514
Area (M2 is CC) Γ1 −ΠRR N.C.(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RA 149 q2 z288 + 21 q z8 + 13 z8 q > 0, z > 0(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RB − (16 q2+15 q+3) z8 + q + 1 > 0 z < 8 q16 q2+15 q+3 + 816 q2+15 q+3(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RC − (49 q2+32 q) z32 − 18 z − −28 q−2432 > 0 z < 4√13 q+9+14 q+1249 q2+32 q
(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RD − (31 q
2+44 q−2) z















) ∩ RC 31 q2 z32 − 18 z + 24−36 q32 > 0 z > 4√28 q2−27 q+931 q2 + 1831 q − 1231 q2
(
MA1 ∩MC2
) ∩ RD (49 q
2−12 q+2) z




337 q2−348 q+100+24 q−14
49 q2−12 q+2
(49 q2−12 q+2) z




337 q2−348 q+100+24 q−14
49 q2−12 q+2(
MA1 ∩MD2
) ∩ RD (q2−28 q+2) z32 − 116 z + 78 > 0 z > √2√q2−28 q+100q2−28 q+2 − 14q2−28 q+2(
MB1 ∩MD2
) ∩ RD (8 q2+7) z16 + 716 z + −16 q−216 > 0 z > 2 32 √q2+2 q−6+8 q+18 q2+7
Table A.13: Retailer gains (z < 1)
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Area (M1 is CC) Π
1
M1
− (Γ2 −Π1R)−ΠRM1 N.C.(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RA − 79 q2 z144 − 4 q z3 − 3 z4 < 0 q > 0, z > 0(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RB (31 q2+36 q+8) z32 − 5 q8 − 12 < 0 z < 20 q31 q2+36 q+8 + 1631 q2+36 q+8
(
MA1 ∩MA2
) ∩ RC (11 q
2+12 q+2) z







11 z − 611
(11 q2+12 q+2) z







11 z − 611(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RA 67 q2 z288 − 47 q z24 − 5 z8 < 0 q < 24√15967 + 28267(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RB (14 q2+4 q+3) z8 − 5 q8 − 12 < 0 z < 5 q14 q2+4 q+3 + 414 q2+4 q+3
(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RC (47 q
2+4 q+8) z





17 q2+4 q+4+4 q+4
47 q2+4 q+8
(47 q2+4 q+8) z





17 q2+4 q+4+4 q+4
47 q2+4 q+8(
MA1 ∩MC2
) ∩ RC − (33 q2+28 q−8) z32 − 18 z − 8−56 q32 > 0 z < 2√163 q2−84 q+12+28 q−433 q2+28 q−8
Area (M2 is CC) Π
2
M2
− (Γ1 −Π2R)−ΠRM2 N.C.(
MA1 ∩MB2
) ∩ RA − 209 q2 z288 − 19 q z24 − 9 z8 < 0 q > 0, z > 0(
MA1 ∩MB2




























) ∩ RD − (4 q
2+5) z





8 − 58 z − −8 q−68 < 0 q < 1z −
√−5 z2+6 z−1
2 z
Table A.14: CC gains (z < 1)
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MA1 ∩ RA 13 (−7 q−6) q z144 + (−7 q−6) z8 < 0 q > 0, z > 0
MA1 ∩ RB (
11 q2+20 q+8) z
32 − 3 q8 − 12 < 0 q < 12 q11 q2+20 q+8 + 1611 q2+20 q+8
MA1 ∩ RC (
q2+4 q+2) z










MB2 ∩ RA 5 q
2 z






MB2 ∩ RB (
53 q2+36 q) z
32 − 5 q8 − 12 < 0 z < 20 q53 q2+36 q + 1653 q2+36 q
MB2 ∩ RC
(11 q2+6 q−1) z





11 z − 311
(11 q2+6 q−1) z





11 z − 311
MB2 ∩ RD q (2 q+1) z2 − q2 > 0 q > 12 z − 12
MC2 ∩ RC − (
9 q2+2 q+1) z






9 z − 19
MC2 ∩ RD 3 q2 − q (3 q+1) z2 > 0 z < 33 q+1
MD2 ∩ RD 0 n.a.
Table A.15: NCC gains (z < 1)
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A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proposition 2.6 has two parts. To prove the first part we show where category profit (ΠCAT ) increases when
a CC is used where the superscripts 1, 2, and R represent the category being managed by M1, M2, and R
respectively (Table A.16) and ΠCAT = ΠM1 + ΠM2 + ΠR. To prove the second part we show where total
consumer surplus (Υ) increases when a CC is used (Tables A.17 and A.18) where Υ is found by integrating
the consumer utility functions for each product from the left most marginal consumer to the right most on
the brand preference line.
Area (M1 is CC) Π
1
CAT −ΠRCAT N.C.
MA1 ∩ RA 7 (q−6) q z288 + (q−6) z48 < 0 q < 6, z > 0
MA1 ∩ RB − q z8 − z8 < 0 q > 0, z > 0
MA1 ∩ RC












Area (M2 is CC) Π
2
CAT −ΠRCAT N.C.
MB2 ∩ RA 5 (6−q) q z72 − (6−q) z12 < 0 q < 65 , z > 0






















MC2 ∩ RC − (
3 q2−10 q+6) z










16 − 3−z16 z > 0 z > 13MC2 ∩ RD
MD2 ∩ RD
Table A.16: Category gains (z < 1)
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Area Υ1(2) Area ΥR































15 q2−2 q−2) z
32 +
1








Table A.17: Consumer surplus by area (z < 1)
Area (M1 is CC) Υ
1 −ΥR N.C.
MA1 ∩ RA 11 q (7 q+6) z576 + (7 q+6) z96 > 0 q > 0, z > 0
MA1 ∩ RB q (q+1) z8 + (q+1) z16 > 0 q > 0, z > 0
MA1 ∩ RC (
23 q2+40 q+16) z







23 z − 2023
Area (M2 is CC) Υ
2 −ΥR N.C.
MB2 ∩ RA
7 q (5 q−6) z
144 − (5 q−6) z24 < 0 q > 67 , z > 0
7 q (5 q−6) z
144 − (5 q−6) z24 > 0 q < 67 , z > 0
MB2 ∩ RB
5 q (3 q−4) z
64 − (3 q−4) z16 < 0 q > 45 , z > 0
5 q (3 q−4) z
64 − (3 q−4) z16 > 0 q < 45 , z > 0
MB2 ∩ RC
(15 q2−2 q+14) z




(15 q2−2 q+14) z




MC2 ∩ RC (
15 q2−2 q+14) z














Table A.18: Consumer surplus gains (z < 1)
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
B.1 Response Functions and Equilibrium Values
Figure B.1 is the same as Figure 3.1 except we have now labeled the areas where unique equilibrium solutions
exist for each scenario when R manages the category. As these unique areas are subsets of the unique areas
when the CC manages the category, we can label the areas for CC management of the category as unions of
the areas when R manages the category, and do so as follows, denoting areas under CC management with
a superscript CC: NONECC1 = NONE1 ∪ NONE2, BMCC1 = BM1, BMCC2 = BM2 ∪ BM3, CMCC1 = CM1,
CMCC2 = CM2 ∪ CM3, BOTHCC1 = BOTH1, BOTHCC2 = BOTH2 and BOTHCC3 = BOTH3 ∪ BOTH4.
B.1.1 Category Managed By R
The retailer response functions after solving each scenario when R manages the category are contained
in Table B.1, and the final values resulting from the manufacturers simultaneously solving their problem
resulting from the retailer’s response functions are contained in Table B.2, where total category profit is
equal to the sum of both manufacturers and R’s profits and is denoted by ΠCAT .
B.1.2 Category Managed By a CC
In order to solve the CC’s problem, we first must calculate how much the CC could earn. Without loss
of generality we assume that m1 = 0; all of the profit from the sales of B1 are then owned by the CC.
Let w+1 represent the retail price that the CC charges for its brand when m1 = 0. w1 and m1 are then
calculated from w+1 to ensure that R’s profit is equal to what it was guaranteed. The CC’s response
functions after solving this problem are contained in Table B.3, and the final values resulting from the NCC
solving its resulting problem are contained in Table B.4 and Table B.5, where Π+M1 = d1w
+
1 represents the
CC’s gross profit before adjusting m1, ΠM1 = ΠM2 represents the CC’s net profit after adjustment, and





Figure B.1: Areas of unique equilibrium solutions when R or the CC manages the category
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Table B.1: Retailer response functions by scenario when R manages the category
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Table B.2: Equilibrium values by scenario when R manages the category

























































Table B.3: CC response functions by scenario
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Table B.4: Equilibrium values by scenario when the CC manages the category
Area Π+M1 = d1w
+
1 ΠM2 = ΠM1 ΠR = Π
+
M1



































































Table B.5: Equilibrium profits by scenario when the CC manages the category
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B.2 Proofs of Propositions
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1 makes three claims. To prove the first claim, we show that R’s profit using a CC is greater
than or equal to its profit when self-managing the category, where the superscripts CC and SM are respec-
tively representative of each. To prove the second claim, we show that the manufacturers’ profits (denoted
by ΠM for both manufacturers since their profits are equal) are less with a CC than when R self-manges the
category. To prove the final claim, we show that R earns at last as much using only BM and only CM as
it does using neither (and that the manufacturers earn less), and that R earns at least as much using both
BM and CM as it does using either only BM or only CM (and that the manufacturers earn less).
Area ΠCCR −ΠSMR ≥ 0 N.C. ΠCCM −ΠSMM ≤ 0 N.C.
NONECC1 ∩NONE1 8−z8 − 2−3z2 = 11z8 z ≥ 0 z4 − z = − 3z4 z ≥ 0
NONECC1 ∩NONE2 8−z8 − z2 = 8−5z8 z ≤ 85 z4 − 12 = z−24 z ≤ 2
BMCC1 ∩ BM1 z+22 − z+22 = 0 n/a 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BMCC2 ∩ BM2 16c+5−2cz16c − 2c+2−3cz2c = 11(2cz−1)16c z ≥ 12c 2cz−18c − 2cz−12c = −3(2cz−1)8c z ≥ 12c
BMCC2 ∩ BM3 16c+5−2cz16c − z2 = 16c+5−10cz16c z ≤ 16c+510c 2cz−18c − 12 = 2cz−4c−18c z ≤ 4c+12c
CMCC1 ∩ CM1 16−z−8c8 − 4−3z−2c2 = 11z8 z ≥ 0 z4 − z = − 3z4 z ≥ 0
CMCC2 ∩ CM2 8c+2−cz8c − 4c+1−6cz4c = 11z8 z ≥ 0 z4 − z = − 3z4 z ≥ 0
CMCC2 ∩ CM3 8c+2−cz8c − 2cz−14c = 8c+4−5cz8c z ≤ 8c+4−5cz8c z4 − 2c+14c = cz−2c−14c z ≤ 2c+1c
BOTHCC1 ∩ BOTH1 z−2c+42 − z−2c+42 = 0 n/a 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC2 ∩ BOTH2 2cz+4c+14c − 2cz+4c+14c = 0 n/a 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC3 ∩ BOTH3 16c+9−2cz16c − 4c+5−6cz4c = 11(2cz−1)16c z ≥ 12c 2cz−18c − 2cz−12c = −3(2cz−1)8c z ≥ 12c
BOTHCC3 ∩ BOTH4 16c+9−2cz16c − 2cz−14c = 16c+13−10cz16c z ≤ 16c+1310c 2cz−18c − 2c+14c = 2cz−4c−38c z ≤ 4c+32c
Table B.6: Proof of Proposition 3.1 claims i and ii
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proposition 3.2 makes three claims: the use of only BM without a CC forces the manufacturers to lower
their prices, the use of only BM with a CC forces the NCC to lower its wholesale price even further, and both
manufacturers are worse off and R is better off when BM is delegated to a CC. For the first claim we use
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Area ∆ΠCCR ≥ 0 N.C. ∆ΠCCM ≤ 0 N.C.
BMCC1 ∩NONECC1 z+22 − 8−z8 = 5z8 z ≥ 0 0− z4 = − z4 z ≥ 0
BMCC2 ∩NONECC1 16c+5−2cz16c − 8−z8 = 516c c ≥ 0 2cz−18c − z4 = − 18c c ≥ 0
CMCC1 ∩NONECC1 16−z−8c8 − 8−z8 = 1− c c ≤ 1 z4 − z4 = 0 n/a
CMCC2 ∩NONECC1 8c+2−cz8c − 8−z8 = 14c c ≥ 0 z4 − z4 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC1 ∩ BMCC1 z−2c+42 − z+22 = 1− c c ≤ 1 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC2 ∩ BMCC1 2cz+4c+14c − z+22 = 14c c ≥ 0 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC3 ∩ BMCC2 16c+9−2cz16c − 16c+5−2cz16c = 14c c ≥ 0 2cz−18c − 2cz−18c = 0 n/a
BOTHCC1 ∩ CMCC1 z−2c+42 − 16−z−8c8 = 5z8 z ≥ 0 0− z4 = − z4 z ≥ 0
BOTHCC2 ∩ CMCC2 2cz+4c+14c − 8c+2−cz8c) = 5z8 z ≥ 0 0− z4 = − z4 z ≥ 0
BOTHCC3 ∩ CMCC2 16c+9−2cz16c − 8c+2−cz8c = 516c c ≥ 0 2cz−18c − z4 = − 18c c ≥ 0
Table B.7: Proof of Proposition 3.1 claim iii
the superscripts NONE and BM to represent the wholesale prices when R self-manages the category and
uses no BM and when it does use BM, respectively. For the second claim we use the superscripts SM and
CC to represent the wholesale prices when R self-manages the category and uses BM and when it delegates
BM, respectively. The third claim is proven in Table B.7.
Area wNONE2 − wBM2 ≥ 0 N.C. Area wSM2 − wCC2 ≥ 0 N.C.
BM1 ∩NONE1 2z − 0 = 2z z ≥ 0 BMCC1 ∩ BM1 0− 0 = 0 n/a
BM1 ∩NONE2 1− 0 = 1 n/a BMCC2 ∩ BM2 2cz−1c − 2cz−12c = 2cz−12c z ≥ 12c
BM2 ∩NONE1 2z − 2cz−1c = 1c c ≥ 0 BMCC2 ∩ BM3 1− 2cz−12c = 2c+1−2cz2c z ≤ 2c+12c
BM2 ∩NONE2 1− 2cz−1c = c+1−2czc z ≤ c+12c
BM3 ∩NONE2 1− 1 = 0 n/a
Table B.8: Proof of Proposition 3.2 claims i and ii
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B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proposition 3.3 makes three claims. To prove the first claim we show that when z ≥ 4c+18c the retailer
earns less self-managing the category and using CM than when it does not use CM. To prove the second
claim we show that category profit increases when only CM is delegated to a CC. The third claim is proven
by comparing the changes in retailer profit from Table B.7 to that of the changes in category profit from
Table B.9. To save space we have combined areas where our parameter of interest is the same.
Area ΠCMR −ΠNONER N.C.
CM1 ∩NONE1 4−3z−2c2 − 2−3z2 = 1− c > 0 c ≤ 1
CM2 ∩NONE1 4c+1−6cz4c − 2−3z2 = 8cz−4c−14c > 0 z < 4c+18c (Otherwise negative)
CM1 ∩NONE2 4−3z−2c2 − z2 = 2− 2z − c > 0 c < 2
CM2 ∩NONE2 4c+1−6cz4c − z2 = 4c+1−8cz4c > 0 z < 4c+18c (Otherwise negative)
CM3 ∩NONE2 2cz−14c − z2 = − 14c < 0 c > 0
Area ΠCMCAT −ΠNONECAT ≥ 0 N.C.
CMCC1 ∩NONECC1 3z−8c+168 − 3z+88 = 1− c c ≤ 1
CMCC2 ∩NONECC1 3cz+8c+28c − 3z+88 = 14c c ≥ 0
Table B.9: Proof of Proposition 3.3 claims i and ii
B.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
To prove Proposition 3.4 we show that when managing the category itself R maximizes its profit by using
both BM and CM until z = 4c+58c , at which point R maximizes its profit by using only BM.
B.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proposition 3.5 has three parts. To prove the first part we show that under retailer self-management, the
use of IMA does not increase consumer surplus. To prove the second part we show that the use of a CC can
increase consumer surplus, as long as the NCC does not set a wholesale price of zero. To prove the third
part we show that the use of a CC for any delegation combination does not improve category profit, and
can actually lead to reductions. To prove the fourth part we show that the delegation of only BM minimizes
the losses in category profit when using a CC.
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Area ΠBOTHR −ΠBMR N.C.
BOTH1 ∩ BM1 z−2c+42 − z+22 = 1− c ≥ 0 c ≤ 1
BOTH2 ∩ BM1 2cz+4c+14c − z+22 = 14c ≥ 0 c ≥ 0
BOTH3 ∩ BM2 4c+5−6cz4c − 2c+2−3cz2c = 14c ≥ 0 c ≥ 0
BOTH3 ∩ BM3 4c+5−6cz4c − z2 = 4c+5−8cz4c ≥ 0 z ≤ 4c+58c
BOTH4 ∩ BM3 2cz−14c − z2 = − 14c ≤ 0 c ≥ 0
Table B.10: Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let υ1 and υ2 represent the total utility received from consumers purchasing B1 and B2 respectively and
Υ = υ1 + υ2 represent the total utility received by all consumers. Table B.11 displays the functions for each
brand for each scenario.
IMA Used υ1 υ2
Neither BM or CM
∫ d1
0
1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 dx
∫ 1




1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s1 dx
∫ 1




1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s2 dx
∫ 1
1−d2 1 + z − w2 −m2 + s2 dx
Both BM and CM
∫ d1
0
1 + z(1− x)− w1 −m1 + s1 + s2 dx
∫ 1
1−d2 1 + z − w2 −m2 − s1 + s2 dx
Table B.11: Total utility functions by brand
Area υ1 υ2 Υ






































Table B.12: Proof of Proposition 3.5 parts 1 and 2
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Area ΠCCCAT −ΠSMCAT ≤ 0 N.C.
NONECC1 ∩ (NONE1 ∪NONE2) 3z+88 − z+22 = − z8 < 0 z ≥ 0
BMCC1 ∩ BM1 z+22 − z+22 = 0 n/a
BMCC2 ∩ (BM2 ∪ BM3) 6cz+16c+116c − z+22 = − 2cz−116c < 0 z ≥ 12c
CMCC1 ∩ CM1 3z−8c+168 − z−2c+42 = − z8 < 0 z ≥ 0
CMCC2 ∩ (CM2 ∪ CM3) 3cz+8c+28c − 2cz+4c+14c = − z8 < 0 z ≥ 0
BOTHCC1 ∩ BOTH1 z−2c+42 − z−2c+42 = 0 n/a
BOTHCC2 ∩ BOTH2 2cz+4c+14c − 2cz+4c+14c = 0 n/a
BOTHCC3 ∩ (BOTH3 ∪ BOTH4) 6cz+16c+516c − 2cz+4c+14c = − 2cz−116c < 0 z ≥ 12c
Area ∆ΠCCCAT > 0 N.C.
BOTHCC1 ∩NONECC1 z−2c+42 − 3z+88 = z−8c+88 c ≤ 1 AND z ≥ 0
BOTHCC1 ∩ BMCC1 z−2c+42 − z+22 = 1− c c ≤ 1
BOTHCC2 ∩ BMCC1 2cz+4c+14c − z+22 = 14c c ≥ 0
BOTHCC3 ∩ BMCC2 6cz+16c+516c − 6cz+16c+116c = 14c c ≥ 0
BOTHCC1 ∩ CMCC1 z−2c+42 − 3z−8c+168 = z8 z ≥ 0
BOTHCC2 ∩ CMCC2 2cz+4c+14c − 3cz+8c+28c = z8 z ≥ 0
BOTHCC3 ∩ CMCC2 6cz+16c+516c − 3cz+8c+28c = 116c c ≥ 0
Table B.13: Proof of Proposition 3.5 parts 3 and 4
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Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
C.1 Line Extensions (No Store Brands or ME)
C.1.1 Category Managed By R
The three games described in Table 4.2 have the unique equilibriums shown in Figure 4.1. Let R0, R1, and
R2 represent the games with zero, one, and two line extensions respectively, where specific equilibriums in
each game are denoted by adding a capital letter before the game number in the superscript. Solving each
game through backwards induction results in the equilibrium values contained in Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3,
for games R0, R1, and R2 respectively.
Area wN1 wN2 mN1 mN2 dN1 dN2
RA0 2 z 2 z 1− 3 z2 1− 3 z2 12 12






























Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR


















Area wN1 wN2 wS1 dN1 dN2 dS1
RA1 y z2 +
3 z













































Area mN1 mN2 mS1
RA1 1− (3 y+3) z4 1− (2 y+1) z2 1− (y+2) z2
RB1




y ((y2+y−2) z−2 y−2)
−4 (y+1)2
















Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR













(y2−2 y+1) z+2 y2+8 y+6
8 (y+1)2





















(2 y2+7 y+3) z−2 y−2
4 (y+1)2 z
mB1N2
(4 y3+9 y2+3 y) z−4 y2−6 y−2
−4 (y+1)2
ΠB1M1
(2 y4+4 y3−5 y2−2 y+1) z2+(4 y3+24 y2+28 y+8) z−4 y2−8 y−4
8 (y+1)3 z
ΠB1R − (
8 y4+12 y3−9 y2−10 y−1) z2+(4 y−4 y3) z−4 y2−8 y−4
16 (y+1)3 z





Area wN1 wN2 wS1 wS2 dN1 dN2 dS1 dS2







































Area mN1 mN2 mS1 mS2
RA2 1− (7 y−1) z4 1− (7 y−1) z4 1− 3 y z2 1− 3 y z2


























Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR






8 1− (13 y−1) z8
RB2 12 − (y−1) z8 12 − (y−1) z8 3 y z8 + z8
RC2 z8 +
1












8 y z +
1
4





C.1.2 M1 and M2’s Product Assortment Preferences (And Partial Proof of
Proposition 4.1)
To show manufacturer line extension preference, we first show that the manufacturers prefer the game R2
over R0 as long as y > 27z +
1
7z2 (Table C.4). Knowing where the manufacturers prefer R
2 over R0, we
then show where the manufacturers prefer R1 over R0 (the top half of Table C.5) and then show where
the manufacturers prefer R1 over R2 (the bottom half of Table C.5). Solving these four problems allows
us to know which product assortment the manufacturers prefer for each pair of y and z. The equilibrium
manufacturer preferences are shown in Figure C.1.






Area Π2M1 −Π0M1 N.C.
RA2 ∩ RA0 7 z8 − 7 y z8 < 0 y < 1 (Use neither)
RA2 ∩ RB0
1
2 − (7 y+1) z8 > 0 y > 47 z − 17 (Use both)
1
2 − (7 y+1) z8 < 0 y < 47 z − 17 (Use neither)
RB2 ∩ RB0 y z8 − z8 > 0 y < 1 (Use both)
RA2 ∩ RC0
− 7 y z8 + 18 z + 14 > 0 y > 27 z + 17 z2 (Use both)
− 7 y z8 + 18 z + 14 < 0 y < 27 z + 17 z2 (Use neither)
RB2 ∩ RC0 y z8 + 18 z − 14 > 0 y < 2z − 1z2 (Use both)
RC2 ∩ RC0 18 z − 18 y z > 0 y < 1 (Use both)
Table C.4: M1 and M2’s preference for using two line extensions over zero
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RA0 ∩ RA1 7 y z16 − 7 z16 < 0 y < 1 (Use zero)
RB0 ∩ RA1
(7 y+9) z
16 > 0 z >
8
7 y+9 − 12 (Use one)
(7 y+9) z
16 < 0 z <
8
7 y+9 − 12 (Use zero)
RB0 ∩ RB1 gR1 > 0 z > zR1 (Use one)
RB0 ∩ RC1 z8 (y+1) − y z8 (y+1) > 0 y < 1 (Use one)
RC0 ∩ RB1 gR2 > 0 z > zR2 (Use one)












(7 y2+9 y) z
8 (y+1) > 0 z <
4 y
7 y2+9 y +
4





(7 y2+9 y) z
8 (y+1) < 0 z >
4 y
7 y2+9 y +
4
7 y2+9 y (Use two)
RB2 ∩ RC1 y2 z8 (y+1) − y z8 (y+1) > 0 y < 1 (Use two)




+ 1y (Use two)
RC2 ∩ RD1 116 z − 116 y z > 0 y < 1 (Use two)
Term Value
gR1
(4 y4+6 y3−7 y2−4 y+1) z2+(12 y2+16 y+4) z−4 y2−8 y−4
16 (y+1)3 z
gR2



















4 y5+18 y4+19 y3+9 y2+9 y+5−2 y2−10 y−4
)
4 y4+4 y3−13 y2−10 y−1
Table C.5: M1 and M2’s preference for using two or zero line extensions over one
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Figure C.1: Equilibrium line extension model by area
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C.1.3 R’s Product Assortment Preferences (And Remainder of Proof of
Proposition 4.1)
To show the retailer’s line extension preference, we first show that the retailer prefers the game R0 over R1
as long as z >
√
7y2+8y+1+1
6y (Table C.6). Knowing where the retailer prefers R
0 over R1, we then show
where the retailer prefers R2 over R1 (the top half of Table C.7) and then show where the retailer prefers
R2 over R1 (the bottom half of Table C.7). Solving these four problems allows us to know which product
assortment the retailer prefers for each pair of y and z. The equilibrium retailer preferences are shown in
Figure C.2.






Area Π0R −Π1R N.C.
RA0 ∩ RA1 13 y z16 − 13 z16 < 0 y < 1 (Use one)
RB0 ∩ RA1
(13 y+19) z
16 − 1 < 0 z < 1613 y+19 (Use one)
(13 y+19) z
16 − 1 > 0 z > 1613 y+19 (Use zero)
RB0 ∩ RB1 gR3 > 0 z > zR3 (Use zero)
RB0 ∩ RC1 3 z8 (y+1) − 3 y z8 (y+1) > 0 y < 1 (Use zero)
RC0 ∩ RB1 gR4 > 0 z > zR4 (Use zero)
RC0 ∩ RC1
2 y+2

















RC0 ∩ RD1 116 z − 116 y z < 0 y < 1 (Use one)
Term Value
gR3
(8 y4+20 y3+15 y2+14 y+7) z2+(4 y−4 y3) z−4 y2−8 y−4
16 (y+1)3 z
gR4















−8 y5−6 y4+17 y3+19 y2+7 y+3−6 y−2
)
(2 y2+3 y−1) (4 y2+y−1)
Table C.6: R’s preference for using one line extension over zero
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Area Π2R −Π0R N.C.
RB0 ∩ RA2
1− (13 y+3) z8 > 0 z < 813 y+3 (Use two)
1− (13 y+3) z8 < 0 813 y+3 (Use zero)
RB0 ∩ RB2 3 y z8 − 3 z8 > 0 y < 1 (Use zero)
RC0 ∩ RA2
3





13 y (Use two)
3





13 y (Use zero)





3 y (Use zero)
Area Π2R −Π1R N.C.
RA1 ∩ RA2 13 z16 − 13 y z16 > 0 y < 1 (Use two)
RC1 ∩ RA2
y
y+1 − 1y+1 −
(13 y2+19 y) z
8 (y+1) > 0 z <
8 y
13 y2+19 y +
8
13 y2+19 y (Use two)
y
y+1 − 1y+1 −
(13 y2+19 y) z
8 (y+1) < 0 z >
8 y
13 y2+19 y +
8
13 y2+19 y (Use one)
RC1 ∩ RB2 3 y2 z8 (y+1) − 3 y z8 (y+1) < 0 y < 1 (Use one)
RD1 ∩ RB2
3 y z






+ 13 y (Use two)
3 y z






+ 13 y (Use one)
RD1 ∩ RC2 116 y z − 116 z < 0 y < 1 (Use one)
Table C.7: R’s preference for using two line extensions over zero or one
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Figure C.2: Equilibrium line extension model by area (R’s preference)
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C.1.4 Category Managed By M1 (And Partial Proof of Proposition 4.2)
The four games where M1 serves as CC have the unique equilibriums shown in Figure 4.3. Let M
0, M1,
M2, and M3 represent the games with zero, one (S1)), one (S2)), and two line extensions respectively, where
specific equilibriums in each game are denoted by adding a capital letter before the game number in the
superscript. Solving each game through backwards induction results in the equilibrium values contained in
Tables C.8, C.9, and C.10, for games M0, M1 and M2, and M3 respectively. All values shown are before the
bids have been placed; these are the values the manufacturers will use to determine their bids. To show
the final equilibrium product assortment and prove the first part Proposition 4.1, we show that M2 weakly
dominates M0 (Table C.11), and that M3 weakly dominates M1 as M2 is never better off by not carrying S2
(Table C.12). The final equilibrium areas are shown in Figure C.3.
Area wN1 wN2 mN1 mN2 dN1 dN2

























Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR











































































Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR
MA1 34 − (y−4) z16 y z8 + z8 14 − (2 y−1) z16
MB1 z4 +
1

















Area wN1 wN2 wS2 mN1 mN2 mS2 dN1 dN2 dS2









































Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR




























16 y z +
1
8












4 + 1 y z 0
4−(2 y−1) z
















































































16 y z +
1
8













Area Π2M2 −Π0M2 ≥ 0 N.C.
MA0 ∩MA2 0 n.c.
MB0 ∩MB2 (z−2)28 z − y (z−2)
2
8 z y < 1
MC0 ∩MB2 −y z8 − y2 z − 58 z − −4 y−28 y < 2 zz2−4 z+4 − 5z2−4 z+4
MC0 ∩MC2 18 y z − 18 z y < 1
Area Π3M2 −Π1M2 ≥ 0 N.C.
MA1 ∩MA3 0 n.c.
MB1 ∩MB3 (y z−2)28 y2 z − (y z−2)
2
8 y z y < 1
MC1 ∩MB3 −y z8 − 1y z − 18 z + 34 3y −
√
1−y






MC1 ∩MC3 18 y z − 18 z y < 1
Table C.11: M2 weakly prefers to always carry S2
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Area Π3M1 −Π2M1 N.C.
MA2 ∩MA3 5 z16 − 5 y z16 > 0 y < 1 (Carry S1)
MB2 ∩MA3
− 5 y z8 − 3 y4 z − 34 z − −8 y−88 > 0 y < 8 z5 z2−8 z+6 − 65 z2−8 z+6 (Carry S1)
− 5 y z8 − 3 y4 z − 34 z − −8 y−88 < 0 y > 8 z5 z2−8 z+6 − 65 z2−8 z+6 (Do not carry S1)
MB2 ∩MB3
− 3 (y−1)4 z − 3 (y−1)2 y z + y − 1 > 0 z < 32 y + 34 (Carry S1)
− 3 (y−1)4 z − 3 (y−1)2 y z + y − 1 < 0 z > 32 y + 34 (Do not carry S1)
MC2 ∩MA3


































5 y (Do not carry S1)
MC2 ∩MC3 14 y z − 14 z y < 1 (Carry S1)
Table C.12: M1 preference for carrying S1 as CC (partial proof of Proposition 4.2)
Figure C.3: Equilibrium line extension model by area with a CC
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C.1.5 Remainder of Proof of Proposition 4.2 (Player Profitability)
To prove the remainder of Proposition 4.2 we show the relationship between the equilibrium values for the
manufacturers preferred number of line extensions when the retailer manages the category (where the areas
used are from the right side of Figure C.4) and the equilibrium number of line extensions when M1 manages
the category as CC (where the areas used are from the right side of Figure C.4). First we show that R
always profits from the use of a CC by showing that ΠMR > Π
R
R where the superscripts M and R represent
the category being managed by M1 and R respectively (Table C.13). Second we show that both M1 and
M2 are always worse off from the use of a CC by showing that Π
M
M2
< ΠRM2 where the superscripts M and
R represent the category being managed by M1 and R respectively (Table C.14).
Figure C.4: Equilibrium line extensions by category manager
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Area ΠMR −ΠRR > 0 N.C.
MA ∩ RA (27−5 y) z16 y < 275
MA ∩ RB 16−(5 y+5) z16 y < 16−5 z5 z
MA ∩ RC (5 y+6) z8 y > 0 and z > 0











3 y2+5 y+2+3 y2+3 y+2
)
y (6−3 y3+4 y2+9 y)
MA ∩ RE 8−(5 y
3+29 y2+7 y−1) z+24 y2+32 y
16 (y+1)2
z < 8 (y+1) (3 y+1)5 y3+29 y2+7 y−1
MA ∩ RF (21 y+1) z16 y > 0 and z > 0
MA ∩ RG 16−(11 y−1) z16 z < 1611 y−1
MA ∩ RH − (5 y
2−y) z2−12 y z+2




y (13 y+1)−6 y
y (5 y−1)
MB ∩ RH (5 y
2+y) z2−20 y z+22
16 y z y > 0 and z > 0
MC ∩ RH (5 y
2+y) z2−(16 y2+4 y) z+12 y2+12 y−2




y (2 y3−20 y2+y+1)+8 y2+2 y
y (5 y+1)













(3 y4−4 y3−9 y2−6 y) z2+(12 y3+24 y2+20 y+8) z+4 y2+8 y+4
16 (y+1)3 z
Table C.13: R always prefers to have a CC manage the category
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Area ΠMM2 −ΠRM2 < 0 N.C.
MA ∩ RA (y−7) z8 y < 7
MA ∩ RB (y+1) z−48 y < 4−zz
MA ∩ RC − 3 (y+1) z8 y > 0 and z > 0
MA ∩ RD − (y
2−4 y−1) z+4 y+4
8 (y+1) z < − 4 (y+1)y2−4 y−1
MA ∩ RE (y
3+6 y2+y) z−6 y2−8 y−2
8 (y+1)2
z < 2 (y+1) (3 y+1)y (y2+6 y+1)
MA ∩ RF − 3 y z4 y > 0 and z > 0
MA ∩ RG y z−24 z < 2y




MB ∩ RH − (y z−3)28 y z y > 0 and z > 0
MC ∩ RH − (y z−2 y−1)28 y z y > 0 and z > 0
MD ∩ RH 0 n.a.
ME ∩ RH 0 n.a.
Table C.14: M1 and M2 always prefer to have R manage the category
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C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3 has two parts. To prove the first part we show where category profit (ΠCAT ) increases






where the superscripts M and R represent the category being managed
by M1 and R respectively (Table C.16) and ΠCAT = ΠM1 + ΠM2 + ΠR. To prove the second part we





M and R represent the category being managed by M1 and R respectively (Table C.15) where Υ is found
by integrating the consumer utility functions for each product from the left most marginal consumer to the
right most on the brand preference line.
Area ΥM −ΥR N.C.
MA ∩ (RA ∪ RB) (5 y−3) z32 < 0 y < 35
(5 y−3) z
32 > 0 y >
3
5
MA ∩ RC y z16 y > 0 and z > 0
MA ∩ RD ΥMA −ΥRD > 0 z > zADΥ
MA ∩ RE (5 y
2−4 y+3) z
32 (y+1) z <
2 (y+1) (3 y+1)
y (y2+6 y+1)
MA ∩ (RF ∪ RG) (3−y) z32 > 0 y < 3
MA ∩ RH (5 y
2+3 y) z2−4 y z−2




y (7 y+3)+2 y
y (5 y+3)
MB ∩ RH (3 y
2+3 y) z2−4 y z+6
32 y z > 0 y > 0 and z > 0
MC ∩ RH (3 y
2+3 y) z2+(4 y−8 y2) z+4 y2+4 y−2




y (2 y3−20 y2−y+3)+4 y2−2 y
3 y (y+1)






ME ∩ RH 3 (y z
2+2 y z+1)
32 y z > 0 y > 0 and z > 0
Term Value
ΥM
A −ΥRD − (3 y











3 y2−3 y+2−3 y2−5 y
)
3 y4+24 y3+27 y2−2 y−4
Table C.15: Changes in total consumer surplus when a CC is used
112
Area ΠMCAT −ΠRCAT N.C.
MA ∩ (RA ∪ RB) − (y+1) z16 < 0 y > 0 and z > 0




















16 (y+1) > 0 y <
√
5− 2
MA ∩ (RF ∪ RG) − (3 y−1) z16 < 0 y > 13
− (3 y−1) z16 > 0 y < 13
MA ∩ RH
− (y
2−y) z2−4 y z+6







2−y) z2−4 y z+6






MB ∩ RH (y
2+y) z2+4 y z−14




MC ∩ RH (y
2+y) z2+4 y z−4 y2−4 y−6
16 y z > 0 y >
√
z4+8 z3+32 z2−32 z−80−z2−4 z+4
2 (z−2) (z+2)
MD ∩ RH y z2+2 y z+4 y−316 y z > 0 y > 3z2+2 z+4




















y4−4 y3−23 y2−18 y−4
Table C.16: Changes in category profit when a CC is used
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C.2 Store Brands With ME
C.2.1 R Will Always Carry At Least One Store Brand (Proof of Lemma 4.1)





dominates the game where they carry no store brands, which is equal to the game R0 from
Appendix A. The equilibrium values for the game R2 can be found in Table C.17, and the equilibrium values
for game R0 can be found in Table C.1. Lemma 4.1 is proven by showing that Π2R > Π
0
R for all areas within
R2 and R0 Table C.18.
Area wN1 wN2 wS1 wS2
RA2 2 z3 − 2 y z3 2 z3 − 2 y z3 z3 − y z3 z3 − y z3
RB2 12 − (y−1) z2 12 − (y−1) z2 1 1
Area mN1 mN2 mS1 mS2


























RB2 14 − 14 (y−1) z 14 − 14 (y−1) z 14 (y−1) z + 14 14 (y−1) z + 14
Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠME ΠR







2 (y−1) z +
1
2
(3 y2−2 y−1) z2+(2 y−2) z−1
8 (y−1) z





Area Π2R −Π1R > 0 N.C.
RA2 ∩ RA0 11 y z18 + 25 z18 y > 0 and z > 0
RA2 ∩ RB0 (11 y−11) z18 + 1 z > 1811−11 y
RA2 ∩ RC0 (44 y−17) z72 − 18 z + 34 z > 6
√
11 y+16
44 y−17 − 2744 y−17
RB2 ∩ RC0 y (3 y−3) z8 (y−1) − y8 (y−1) z y > 0 and z > 0
Table C.18: The game R2 dominates the game R0
C.2.2 R’s Preferred Product Assortment When Carrying Store Brands (Proof
of Proposition 4.4)
To prove Proposition 4.4 we first must solve the game R1, as R2 was solved for our proof of Lemma 4.1. The
equilibrium results from solving game R1 can be found in Tables C.19 and C.20. The final step to proving
Proposition 4.4 is to show for which values of y and z Π2R > Π
1
R. These results can be found in Table C.21.
The resulting equilibrium by area is shown in Figure C.5.
Figure C.5: Areas of unique equilibrium when R manages the category and optimizes its assortment
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Area wN1 wN2 wS1
RA1 2 z3 − y
2 z









RB1 (2 y−2) zy−4 +
y











RC1 −y2 z6 − y z2 + 2 z3 z2 + 12 z3 − y
2 z
3
RD1 (2 y−2) zy−4 +
y





RE1 (2 y−2) zy−4 +
y









(2 y2−5 y) z
12 + 1
(3 y2+4 y−4) z
12 + 1
RB1
(y4−7 y3−4 y2+4 y−12) z+6 y2−48 y−30
12 (y−4) (y+1)
(2 y4−13 y3+9 y2+28 y−8) z+12 y2−48 y−36
12 (y−4) (y+1)
(y4−7 y3−16 y2+4 y) z−48 y−24
12 (y−4) (y+1)
RC1
(y3+6 y2+2 y) z+9 y+12
12 (y+1)
(2 y2+1) z+6 y+9
12 (y+1)
(2 y3+10 y2+y−4) z+9 y+12
12 (y+1)
RD1 − (5 y
2+4) z−y2+12 y+10
4 (y−4) (y+1) −
(2 y2−3 y+4) z−2 y2+9 y+8
4 (y−4) (y+1) − 9 y
2 z+y2+12 y+8
4 (y−4) (y+1)
RE1 − (y+2) z2 (y−4) − 32 (y−4) z4 + 14 − 3 y z2 (y−4) − y2 (y−4) − 1y−4





3 − y12 13
RB1 − 2 z+12 (y−4) z
(y3+5 y2−16 y−8) z+12 y−12
12 (y−4) (y+1) z
18−6 y−(y3−7 y2+8 y+28) z
12 (y−4) (y+1) z
RC1 y12 +
1




4 (y+1) z +
y2+y+3
12 (y+1)
RD1 − 2 z+12 (y−4) z
(4 y2−9 y−4) z+3 y
4 (y−4) (y+1) z
(y−8) z−y+2
4 (y−4) (y+1) z
RE1 − 12 (y−4) z − 1y−4 14 z + 14 − 1(y−4) y z − 12 (y−4)





Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠME ΠR
RA1 (y+4)
2 z

































8 (y+1) z −














8 (y−4) (y+1) z +
(4 y2−9 y−4) (z+1)














2 (y−4)2 y z −
(y z+2)2







− (y−1) y (y z+2)
2 (y−4)2 (y+1) z +
3 (y−1) (y z+2)
2 (y−4)2 (y+1) z −





(y6+10 y5−151 y4+400 y3+176 y2−320 y+208) z2+(24 y4−48 y3−504 y2+1632 y+1488) z+108 y2−288 y+180




(3 y4+16 y3+49 y2+20 y−7) z
144 (y+1) +
1







2 (y−4)2 (y+1) z +





8 y3−49 y2−8 y−32) z
16 (y−4)2 (y+1) +
5 y2
16 (y−4)2 (y+1) z +
1






(y3+12 y2+32 y) z
16 (y−4)2 y +
y2
16 (y−4)2 z − y2 (y−4)2 z + 1(y−4)2 y z + 94 (y−4)2 z + 2 y
3−8 y2+96 y
16 (y−4)2 y











Area Π2R −Π1R > 0 N.C.
RA1 ∩ RA2 −y (17 y−44) z72 > 0 y < 4417
RB1 ∩ RA2
gBA > 0 z > zBA
gBA < 0 z < zBA
RC1 ∩ RA2 (3 y
4+16 y3−39 y2−52 y+9) z2+(12 y2−36 y−30) z+9
−144 (y+1) z > 0 z >
3
(√
y4−40 y3+55 y2+112 y+16−2 y2+6 y+5
)
3 y4+16 y3−39 y2−52 y+9
RD1 ∩ RA2
gDA > 0 z > zDA
gDA < 0 z < zDA
RD1 ∩ RB2
gDB > 0 z > zDB
gDB < 0 z < zDB
RE1 ∩ RA2 gEA > 0 z > zEA
RE1 ∩ RB2 gEB > 0 z > zEB
Term Value
gBA
(y6+10 y5−239 y4+1032 y3−640 y2−1600 y+464) z2+(24 y4−192 y3+504 y2+480 y−816) z+108 y2−288 y+180
−144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gDA
(88 y4−560 y3+375 y2+1208 y−544) z2+(72 y3−522 y2−72 y+1008) z−45 y2−36
144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gDB
(6 y5−38 y4+17 y3+119 y2−104 y) z2+(−4 y4+30 y3−130 y2+24 y+80) z−7 y3+19 y2−20 y−28
16 (y−4)2 (y−1) (y+1) z
gEA
(88 y4−729 y3+1428 y2−544 y) z2+(126 y3−1080 y2+1440 y) z−9 y3+72 y2−324 y−144
144 (y−4)2 y z
gEB
(6 y5−53 y4+115 y3−68 y2) z2+(2 y4−26 y3−8 y2+32 y) z−y4+7 y3−28 y2−12 y+16






y6−78 y5+576 y4−386 y3−721 y2+464 y+144+2 y4−16 y3+42 y2+40 y−68
)






146 y4−54 y3−391 y2+216 y+407−12 y3+87 y2+12 y−168
)





23 y6−36 y5+67 y4+72 y3−140 y2−36 y+50+2 y4−15 y3+65 y2−12 y−40






y (22 y4−72 y3−211 y2+883 y−136)−21 y3+180 y2−240 y
)





3 y5−23 y4+82 y3−38 y2−66 y+42−y3+13 y2+4 y−16
(y−1) y (6 y2−47 y+68)
Table C.21: Proof of Proposition 4.4
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C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4.5
The proof of Proposition 4.5 has several parts. First is the claim that the games S2 and S3 produce the
same equilibrium values. This can be seen in the top two parts of Table C.22. Next we show that when
M1 produces only a single store brand that it is only able to secure category captainship by producing S2







> 0 for all y and z (top part of Table C.23). Showing that
R is always better off using M1 as CC rather than ME to produce its store brands is shown in the second
part of Table C.23
(
Π2M1 −Π2M2 −ΠRR > 0
)
. Finally, showing that M1 and M2 are always worse off when








M1 supplies S1 and S2
Area wN1 wN2 wS1 wS2 mN2 dN1 dN2 dS1 dS2
SA1 z2 + 1
z
2 − y z2 y z2 + 1 y z2 + 1 (y+1) z4 + 1 12 14 0 14
Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR




8 − y z8 (y+1) z16 + 14
M1 supplies only S2
Area wN1 wN2 wS1 wS2 mN2 dN1 dN2 dS1 dS2
SA3 z2 + 1
z
2 − y z2 n.a. y z2 + 1 (y+1) z4 + 1 12 14 n.a. 14
Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR




8 − y z8 (y+1) z16 + 14
M1 supplies only S1
Area wN1 wN2 wS1 wS2 mN2 dN1 dN2 dS1 dS2


































2 y z n.a
Area ΠM1 ΠM2 ΠR
SA2 34 − (y−4) z16 y z8 + z8 14 − (2 y−1) z16
SB2 z4 +
1
















Table C.22: Equilibrium values when M1 is CC and provides S1 and/or S2
(
games S1, S2, S3
)
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M1 supplying S2 instead S1 maximizes its bid
(
Π2M1 −Π2M2 > Π1M1 −Π1M2
)





SA2 ∩ SA1 5 y z8 z > 0 and y > 0
SB2 ∩ SA1 (5 y
3−5 y2) z
16 y2 − 34 y z − 34 y2 z + 16 y
2+16 y




5 y2−5 y − 8 y5 y2−5 y − 85 y2−5 y









R −ΠS2M2 > ΠRR
)
Area Π2M1 + Π
2
R −Π2M2 −ΠRR > 0 N.C.
SA2 ∩ RA (y+35) z+7272 y > 0 and z > 0
SA2 ∩ RB g1 z > z1
SA2 ∩ RC g2 z > z2
SA2 ∩ RD (2 y
2−2) z2+(14 y−14) z+1
8 (y−1) z z >
√
47 y2−98 y+51+7 y−7
2 (1−y) (y+1)










2 < 0 N.C.
SA2 ∩ RA 7 (y−1) z72 < 0 y < 1
SA2 ∩ RB (y




SA2 ∩ RC (y
3−10 y) z2+(4 y2−6 y−4) z+3 y
8 (4−y) (y+1) z z >
√
y4−12 y3+31 y2+12 y+4+2 y2−3 y−2
y (10−y2)
SA2 ∩ RD (2 y−2) z−18 (1−y) z z > 12 (y−1)
Term Value
g1
(y6+10 y5−241 y4+976 y3−166 y2−2192 y−656) z2+(24 y4−336 y3+1512 y2−672 y−3120) z+108 y2−288 y+180
−144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
g2
(10 y4−56 y3−11 y2+200 y+64) z2+(24 y3−170 y2+120 y+368) z−5 y2−4






y6−126 y5+1062 y4−1674 y3−2901 y2+4392 y+4430−2 y4+28 y3−126 y2+56 y+260
)





97 y4−384 y3−299 y2+1248 y+1066+12 y3−85 y2+60 y+184
10 y4−56 y3−11 y2+200 y+64
Table C.23: Proof of Proposition 4.5
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C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4.6
We prove Proposition 4.6 in the same way in which we proved Proposition 4.3. These results are shown in
Tables C.24 and C.25 for changes in category profit (ΠCAT ) and consumer surplus (Υ) respectively.
ΠCAT mostly decreases from the use of a CC
Area ΠSCAT −ΠRCAT N.C.
SA2 ∩ RA (y−1) z144 < 0 y > 0 and z > 0
SA2 ∩ RB
gAB < 0 z > zAB
gAB > 0 z < zAB
SA2 ∩ RC gAC < 0 z > − (y−4)
√
−y (y3−8 y2−y+8)+2 y3−y2+16 y−8
y4−4 y3+28 y2−32 y+16
SA2 ∩ RD
(y2−2 y+1) z2+(4 y−4) z+2




(y2−2 y+1) z2+(4 y−4) z+2






(y6−2 y5−22 y4+100 y3−y2−8 y+256) z2+(24 y4−120 y3+216 y2+408 y−528) z+108 y2−288 y+180
144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gAC
(y4−4 y3+28 y2−32 y+16) z2+(4 y3−2 y2+32 y−16) z+5 y2+4






y4−20 y3+96 y2−118 y+41+2 y4−10 y3+18 y2+34 y−44
)
y6−2 y5−22 y4+100 y3−y2−8 y+256
Table C.24: Proof of Proposition 4.6 (changes in ΠCAT )
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Area ΥS −ΥR < 0 N.C.





SA2 ∩ RB g3 z > z3
SA2 ∩ RC g4 z > z4
SA2 ∩ RD − (3 y
2−18 y+15) z2+(28−28 y) z−16 y+14









24 y4 − 480 y3 + 2808 y2 − 3264 y − 4272) z − 144 y3 + 1116 y2 − 1440 y − 2124
g3 − (y
6−14 y5+86 y4−284 y3+695 y2+136 y−2240) z2+c1
288 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
g4
(3 y4−20 y3−16 y+240) z2+(32 y3−250 y2+280 y+496) z+16 y3−117 y2+128 y+252






4 y7−51 y6+186 y5+537 y4−4290 y3+4893 y2+6836 y−339−2 y4+40 y3−234 y2+272 y+356
)




−48 y5+543 y4−1612 y3+581 y2+2704 y+64−16 y3+125 y2−140 y−248
3 y4−20 y3−16 y+240
Table C.25: Proof of Proposition 4.6 changes in Υ
C.2.5 Proof of Proposition 4.7
Proposition 4.7 has two parts. First we show where R earns more using M1 as a CC who only carries S1 than
managing the category itself and using ME to produce its store brands (Table C.26). Second we show where
M1 and M2 earn more when R uses M1 as a CC who only carries S1 than when R manages the category
itself and uses ME to produce its store brands (Table C.27). Exceptionally large values which result from
proving Proposition 4.7 are contained in Table C.28. The overlapping areas where both the retailer and the
manufacturers are profitable from the use of M1 as a CC who only carries S1 is shown in Figure 4.9.
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Changes in retailer profit from using M1 as a CC with only S1
Area Π1M1 + Π
1














SA1 ∩ RB g11 > 0 z < z11
SA1 ∩ RC
(3 y4+16 y3+94 y2+38 y−34) z2+(12 y2−36 y−30) z+9
−144 (y+1) z > 0 z <
3
(√
y4−40 y3−78 y2+22 y+59−2 y2+6 y+5
)
3 y4+16 y3+94 y2+38 y−34
(3 y4+16 y3+94 y2+38 y−34) z2+(12 y2−36 y−30) z+9
−144 (y+1) z < 0 z >
3
(√
y4−40 y3−78 y2+22 y+59−2 y2+6 y+5
)
3 y4+16 y3+94 y2+38 y−34
SA1 ∩ RD
g12 > 0 z < z12
g12 < 0 z > z12
SB1 ∩ RD g13 < 0 z > z13
SA1 ∩ RE
g14 > 0 z < z14
g14 < 0 z > z14
SB1 ∩ RE g15 < 0 z > z15
SC1 ∩ RE (
y3−18 y2+8 y) z2+(2 y3−20 y2) z−y3+10 y2−42 y+24




y (y3−16 y2+21 y−6)−y3+10 y2
y (y2−18 y+8)
Table C.26: Proof of Proposition 4.7 (retailer profitability)
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2 < 0 N.C.
SA1 ∩ RA
(7 y2+9 y−7) z




(7 y2+9 y−7) z




SA1 ∩ RB g16 < 0 z < z16
SA1 ∩ RC
(y4+8 y3+39 y2+10 y−13) z2+(6 y2−18 y−6) z+9





−7 y3−16 y2−2 y+7−y2+3 y+1
)
y4+8 y3+39 y2+10 y−13
(y4+8 y3+39 y2+10 y−13) z2+(6 y2−18 y−6) z+9





−7 y3−16 y2−2 y+7−y2+3 y+1
)
y4+8 y3+39 y2+10 y−13
SA1 ∩ RD
g17 > 0 z > z17
g17 < 0 z < z17
SB1 ∩ RD g18 > 0 z > z18
SA1 ∩ RE
(2 y3−15 y2+40 y) z2+(32 y−2 y2−48) z−y2+12 y−20




y3−11 y2+10 y+18−y2+16 y−24
−y (2 y2−15 y+40)
(2 y3−15 y2+40 y) z2+(32 y−2 y2−48) z−y2+12 y−20




y3−11 y2+10 y+18−y2+16 y−24
−y (2 y2−15 y+40)
SB1 ∩ RE g19 > 0 z19 > 0
SC1 ∩ RE (y
2+8 y) z2+(2 y2+16) z+y2−4 y+12
16 (y−4)2 z > 0 z >
y2−2√1−y y+8√1−y+8
−y (y+8)




(y6+10 y5−106 y4+58 y3+725 y2+184 y−224) z2+(24 y4−192 y3+504 y2+480 y−816) z+108 y2−288 y+180
−144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
g12 − (5 y
4−46 y3+110 y2+64 y−16) z2+(−8 y3+58 y2+8 y−112) z+5 y2+4
16 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
g13
(16 y5−105 y4+56 y3+96 y2) z2+(−8 y5+38 y4−24 y3−272 y2−256 y) z+7 y4−72 y3+8 y2+288 y+192
16 (y−4)2 y2 (y+1) z
g14 − (5 y
4−42 y3+116 y2−16 y) z2+(−14 y3+120 y2−160 y) z+y3−8 y2+36 y+16
16 (y−4)2 y z
g15
(7 y4−76 y3+96 y2) z2+(−2 y4−8 y3+32 y2−256 y) z−y4+20 y3−120 y2+80 y+192






y6−78 y5+177 y4+408 y3−537 y2−330 y+359+2 y4−16 y3+42 y2+40 y−68
)
y6+10 y5−106 y4+58 y3+725 y2+184 y−224
z12 − (y−4)
√
−9 y4−74 y3−209 y2+56 y+200−4 y3+29 y2+4 y−56







2 y6−17 y5+125 y4+341 y3+177 y2−36 y−16+4 y4−19 y3+12 y2+136 y+128
y (16 y3−105 y2+56 y+96)
z14 − (y−4)
√
−y (5 y4−91 y3+664 y2−328 y−16)−7 y3+60 y2−80 y







y4−18 y3+145 y2+14 y−16+y3+4 y2−16 y+128
y (7 y2−76 y+96)
g16
(y5−3 y4−22 y3+74 y2+96 y+16) z2+(12 y3−108 y2+432 y−336) z+36 y−36
144 (y−4)2 z
g17
(2 y4−16 y3+43 y2+16 y) z2+(−4 y3+38 y2−20 y−32) z+y2+12 y−4
16 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
g18
(4 y5−41 y4+32 y3+32 y2) z2+(−4 y5+10 y4+12 y3−160 y2−128 y) z+7 y4−60 y3+12 y2+192 y+128
−16 (y−4)2 y2 (y+1) z
g19 − (y
4−24 y3+32 y2) z2+(−6 y4+24 y3−16 y2−128 y) z+y4−4 y3−36 y2+64 y+128






−7 y3+30 y2−48 y+25+y3−9 y2+36 y−28
)





y4−34 y3−9 y2+16 y+8−2 y3+19 y2−10 y−16




y4−4 y3+84 y2+148 y+68+2 y4−5 y3−6 y2+80 y+64




y (2 y3+5 y2+33 y+32)+3 y3−12 y2+8 y+64
y (y2−24 y+32)
Table C.28: Large values for the proof of Proposition 4.7
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C.2.6 Proof of Lemma 4.2
To prove Lemma 4.2 we first solve the games where ME as CC elects to carry only a single store brand
(which without loss of generality we assume to be S1) and when it elects to carry both S1 and S2, which are
denoted as E1 and E2 respectively. The equilibrium values for these two games can be found in Table C.30.







for all values of y and z (top part of Table C.29). Next we show that when M1 and M2 are














R (middle part of Table C.29). Finally we show that when M1 and M2 are
unwilling to produce opposite branded store brands that they earn less when ME is CC than when one of






(bottom part of Table C.29).












−ΠE1ME > 0 N.C.
EA2 ∩ EA1 3 y z8 y > 0 and z > 0
EA2 ∩ EB1 (3 y
3−3 y2) z2+(8 y2+8 y) z−4 y−4
16 y2 z z >
2
(√
7 y2+8 y+1−2 y−2
)
3 (y−1) y



































SA2 ∩ EA2 (y+1) z+44 y > 0 and z > 0












−ΠE2M2 < 0 N.C.
SA1 ∩ EA2 (1−y) z+48 y > 0 and z > 0










Table C.29: Proof of Lemma 4.2
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Game E1

























































(y z+1) (y z+2)
8 y z






































Table C.30: Equilibrium values when ME manages the category
(
games E1 and E2
)
C.2.7 Proof of Proposition 4.8
To prove Proposition 4.8 we first show that R will always use ME as a CC if that is its only option as
ΠER > Π
R
R (top part of Table C.31). We then show for which values of y and z R prefers to use ME as CC
over M1 when M1 is only willing to produce S1 (middle part of Table C.31). Finally we show where ΠCAT
(Table C.32) and Υ (Table C.33) increase and decrease when the optimal manufacturer is selected as CC.
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Area ΠER −ΠRR > 0 N.C.
EA2 ∩ RA 17 (1−y) z72 y > 0 and z > 0
EA2 ∩ RB gE1 z < zE1
EA2 ∩ RC gE2 z < zE2
EA2 ∩ RD (6 y−6) z+18 (y−1) z z < 16 (1−y)






Area ΠER −Π1R N.C.
EA2 ∩ SA1
(11 y−1) z




16 < 0 y <
1
11 (Use M1)
EA2 ∩ SB1 (3 y
3−3 y2) z2+(8 y2+8 y) z−6 y−6




17 y2+16 y−1−4 y−4
3 (y−1) y (Use ME)
EA2 ∩ SC1 (6 y
2−y) z2+10 y z+y−4




−y (3 y2−25 y+2)−5 y
y (6 y−1) (Use ME)
Term Value
gE1
(y6+10 y5−205 y4+760 y3−130 y2−1328 y−80) z2+(24 y4−192 y3+504 y2+480 y−816) z+108 y2−288 y+180
−144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gE2
(6 y4−32 y3−15 y2+104 y) z2+(8 y3−58 y2−8 y+112) z−5 y2−4






y6−78 y5+474 y4−114 y3−789 y2+192 y+314−2 y4+16 y3−42 y2−40 y+68
)





23 y4−12 y3−85 y2+48 y+98−4 y3+29 y2+4 y−56
y (6 y3−32 y2−15 y+104)
Table C.31: Proof of Proposition 4.8 (CC selection)
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Changes in ΠCAT when M1 or ME is CC
Area Π1CAT −ΠRCAT N.C.
SA1 ∩ RA − (17 y+1) z144 < 0 y > 0 and z > 0
SA1 ∩ RB
gC1 < 0 z > zC1
gC1 > 0 z < zC1
SA1 ∩ RC gC2 > 0 z < 12−y
Area ΠECAT −ΠRCAT < 0 N.C.
EA2 ∩ RA 5 (y−1) z72 < 0 y > 0 and z > 0
EA2 ∩ RB gC3 < 0 z < zC3
EA2 ∩ RC gC4 < 0 z < zC4
EA2 ∩ RD − (2 y−2) z+18 (y−1) z < 0 z < 12 (1−y)
Term Value
gC1
(y−1) ((y5−y4−41 y3+185 y2+40 y−256) z2+(24 y3−96 y2+120 y+528) z+108 y−180)
144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gC2 − ((y−2) z+1) ((y
3−8 y2−28 y+8) z−5 y2−4)
16 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gC3
(y6−2 y5−13 y4+28 y3+134 y2+64 y+112) z2+(24 y4−120 y3+216 y2+408 y−528) z+108 y2−288 y+180
144 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gC4
(2 y4−12 y3+43 y2−24 y) z2+(4 y3−2 y2+32 y−16) z+5 y2+4






y4−16 y3+78 y2+136 y+41−2 y3+8 y2−10 y−44
)






y6−18 y5+30 y4+126 y3−117 y2−108 y+86−2 y4+10 y3−18 y2−34 y+44
)





−3 y4+4 y3+y2−4 y+2−2 y3+y2−16 y+8
y (2 y3−12 y2+43 y−24)
Table C.32: Proof of Proposition 4.8 (Changes in ΠCAT )
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Changes in Υ when M1 or ME is CC
Area Υ1 −ΥR > 0 N.C.
SA1 ∩ RA (5 y+13) z288 y > 0 and z > 0
SA1 ∩ RB gU1 z < zU1
SA1 ∩ RC gU2 z < 12−y
Area ΥE −ΥR < 0 N.C.
EA2 ∩ RA 7 (y−1) z144 y > 0 and z > 0
EA2 ∩ RB gU3 z > zU3
EA2 ∩ RC gU4 z > zU4
EA2 ∩ RD 1−(2 y−2) z16 (y−1) z z > 12 y−2
Term Value
gU1 − (y−1) ((y
5−13 y4+55 y3+5 y2−200 y+512) z2+(24 y3−168 y2+624 y−336) z+108 y−180)
288 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gU2
((y−2) z+1) ((5 y3−36 y2+28 y−24) z−5 y2−4)
32 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gU3
(y6−14 y5+59 y4+40 y3−466 y2+784 y−80) z2−(24 y4−192 y3+792 y2−960 y+336) z−108 y2+288 y−180
−288 (y−4)2 (y+1) z
gU4
(6 y4−56 y3+129 y2−88 y) z2+(−26 y2+24 y−16) z−5 y2−4






y4−4 y3+126 y2−236 y+209+2 y3−14 y2+52 y−28
)




y6−6 y5+162 y4−618 y3+915 y2−528 y+74−12 y4+96 y3−396 y2+480 y−168





15 y4−20 y3+19 y2−16 y+2+13 y2−12 y+8
6 y4−56 y3+129 y2−88 y
Table C.33: Proof of Proposition 4.8 (Changes in Υ)
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